Autozone, Inc. and Autozoners L.L.C. v. Mario Flores
04-15-00307-CV
| Tex. App. | Jun 23, 2015Background
- Mario Flores, an AutoZone store manager, signed AutoZone’s Texas Occupational Injury Benefit Plan (acknowledged in 2005 and again via company computer in 2011–2012) and later claimed a work‑related ladder injury (Mar. 27, 2013).
- The Plan contains a broad mandatory dispute‑resolution clause: mediation then arbitration (AAA rules), an express choice that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) governs, and a statement that AutoZone is involved in interstate commerce.
- Flores sued AutoZone in Texas state court for negligence seeking money damages; AutoZone moved to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.
- Flores opposed on three grounds: (1) FAA §1 employment‑contract exemption applies; (2) Texas Labor Code §406.033(e) (nonwaivable pre‑injury waiver) bars arbitration; and (3) procedural unconscionability because he could not read the English documents.
- The trial court denied AutoZone’s motion to compel arbitration; AutoZone appealed interlocutorily under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §51.016.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the FAA apply to the Plan? | Flores: Plan is a contract of employment so §1 exemption bars FAA. | AutoZone: Plan expressly invokes the FAA and the Plan/administration involves interstate commerce; FAA applies. | Appellants argue FAA governs; (they seek reversal of trial court and enforcement). |
| Are the claims within the scope of the arbitration clause? | Flores: claims should proceed in court. | AutoZone: clause is broad and covers any personal‑injury/job‑related claims; arbitrator reserved to decide gateway questions. | Appellants argue claims fall within scope and gateway issues are for arbitrator. |
| Does Texas Labor Code §406.033(e) bar arbitration? | Flores: statute prohibits pre‑injury waivers of cause of action, rendering arbitration void. | AutoZone: Supreme Court of Texas precedent holds §406.033(e) does not void arbitration agreements; FAA would preempt any conflict. | Appellants rely on In re Golden Peanut and preemption; they ask court to enforce arbitration. |
| Is the agreement procedurally unconscionable because Flores could not read English? | Flores: inability to read English prevented meaningful assent; unconscionable. | AutoZone: challenge attacks the whole Plan (Prima Paint / Rent‑A‑Center → arbitrator decides); moreover parol‑evidence rule and Texas precedent disfavor illiteracy as a defense absent fraud; Spanish notice/translation tools were available. | Appellants contend unconscionability is for arbitrator and, on the merits, Flores failed to prove inability or fraud; trial court erred denying motion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (§1 employment exemption is limited to transportation workers actually engaged in interstate commerce)
- Rent‑A‑Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (parties may delegate gateway arbitrability questions to the arbitrator; challenges to the contract as a whole go to arbitrator)
- Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) (under FAA, challenges to the contract as a whole are for the arbitrator; courts decide only challenges to the arbitration clause itself)
- Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (Prima Paint rule applies in state courts under federal arbitration law)
- In re Golden Peanut Co., LLC, 298 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2009) (Texas Supreme Court: Tex. Lab. Code §406.033(e) does not void arbitration agreements)
- Allied‑Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (the FAA’s coverage is broad; “involving commerce” interpreted expansively)