Austin v. Town of Farmington
113 F. Supp. 3d 650
W.D.N.Y.2015Background
- Colleen and John Austin, parents of a severely disabled son (cerebral palsy), obtained a Town of Farmington variance permitting an above‑ground pool and protective fence despite a zoning ban on accessory structures.
- The Town Board resolution granted the accommodation as temporary and required removal of the pool and fence within 21 days after their disabled son ceases to be a primary resident or the owners convey the property; removal costs would be borne by the Austins or new owners.
- Plaintiffs sued under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(f)(3), 3617, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the restoration/removal condition.
- Defendant moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); plaintiffs cross‑moved for summary judgment.
- The court found plaintiffs had standing and the claim was ripe because the resolution explicitly conditions removal on sale or the disabled son’s departure, but concluded plaintiffs failed to state an FHA violation.
- The court denied plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and granted defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs may challenge the removal/restoration condition as an FHA violation | The restoration requirement discriminates on the basis of disability by imposing removal when the disabled resident leaves or property is sold, violating § 3604(f)(3) and § 3617 | The condition is a permissible temporary accommodation; plaintiffs’ claim is not ripe or justiciable and the FHA does not bar such a restoration condition | Court: claim is justiciable (standing & ripeness), but plaintiffs failed to show an FHA violation; dismissal granted |
| Whether the restoration condition constitutes a "reasonable modification" or a prohibited refusal to accommodate under § 3604(f)(3) | The condition unreasonably conditions the accommodation on continued ownership/residence, effectively penalizing disability | The Town properly granted a temporary accommodation and may condition it on restoration once the disability‑related need ends | Court: no violation; plaintiffs did not challenge the zoning rule or variance generally and failed to show the condition was a refusal to accommodate |
| Whether the restoration requirement demonstrates disparate treatment or discriminatory intent | The condition stems from the son’s disability and thus is discriminatory (disparate treatment) | No facts show discriminatory intent; the variance was granted knowing the son’s disability and the condition applies to end of need rather than singling out disabled persons | Court: plaintiffs pleaded no facts showing intent; disparate treatment claim fails |
| Whether the restoration requirement has a disparate impact on disabled persons | The condition disproportionately burdens disabled persons and thus has disparate impact | No evidence that the restoration condition applies only to disabled households or has greater effect on them | Court: plaintiffs did not show a prima facie disparate‑impact case; claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2008) (Rule 12(b)(6) standard on factual allegations)
- LeBlanc‑Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995) (pre‑enforcement challenge to ordinances may be allowed when discriminatory application is likely)
- Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988) (disparate treatment and disparate impact framework for housing discrimination)
- Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing reasonable modification requests from conditions; analysis of zoning accommodations under the FHA)
- Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 596 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979) (standards for preliminary injunctive relief)