Austin v. Town of Farmington
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 11283
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Colleen and John Austin bought a house in Farmington, NY, and sought variances from a subdivision rule banning accessory structures on "patio lots" so they could install a fence, above‑ground pool, and deck to accommodate their disabled son.
- The Town Board granted temporary variances but included "Restoration Provisions" requiring removal of the fence, pool, and deck (at the owners' expense) within 21 days after the disabled child ceased living on the property or after any transfer of ownership.
- Appellants installed the structures at a cost exceeding $27,000; removal was estimated at roughly $6,630. They sued under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) §3604(f)(3) for denial of a reasonable accommodation and under §3617 for retaliation.
- The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), finding no plausible allegation of discriminatory intent or disparate‑impact and concluding the restoration condition was not a per se FHA violation.
- The Second Circuit reviewed de novo, held that the Restoration Provisions implicate the reasonableness inquiry under §3604(f)(3)(B) (accommodations), and remanded that claim for factual development, but affirmed dismissal of the retaliation claim for failure to plead retaliatory motive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Restoration Provisions violated FHA by denying a reasonable accommodation under §3604(f)(3) | Austin: permanent removal requirement effectively denies a reasonable accommodation and burdens disabled occupant’s full enjoyment; restoration conditions are unreasonable as applied | Town: granted accommodation (temporary variances); restoration condition reasonable to preserve land-use uniformity and avoid variances running with the land | Court: Whether the restoration condition was reasonable is a fact‑specific issue not resolvable on the pleadings; remanded for factual development |
| Whether appellants pleaded discriminatory intent or disparate impact sufficient to survive Rule 12(b)(6) | Austin: the face of the Restoration Provisions and differential zoning elsewhere show discrimination | Town: no allegations of intent; restoration simply restores uniform rules after need ends | Court: Plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege discriminatory intent or disparate impact; but intent not required for §3604(f)(3) accommodation claim — ruling focused on reasonableness instead |
| Whether the Restoration Provisions are governed by §3604(f)(3)(A) (modifications) or (B) (accommodations) | Austin: (A) permits interior restoration in rentals but shows restorations generally are per se unreasonable | Town: Town is a land‑use regulator, not a housing provider, so §3604(f)(3)(B) governs | Court: (B) governs; (A) applies to housing providers. No per se rule against restoration under (B) but reasonableness must be assessed |
| Whether the retaliation claim under §3617 was plausibly pleaded | Austin: lack of justification and existence of other smaller lots without accessory restrictions imply retaliatory motive | Town: Restoration Provisions are neutral and restorative—no plausible retaliatory motive alleged | Court: Affirmed dismissal of retaliation claim for failure to plead nonconclusory facts showing retaliatory intent |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2002) (standard for Rule 12(b)(6) review)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading requirements for plausible claims)
- City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725 (U.S. 1995) (applying FHA to zoning rules)
- Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293 (2d Cir. 2009) (statutory text read as whole)
- Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasonableness issues often fact‑specific)
- Hovsons, Inc. v. Twp. of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096 (3d Cir. 1996) (reasonableness requires case‑by‑case balancing)
- Olson v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2014) (undue burden/financial hardship relevant to reasonableness)
- Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (retaliation claims require proof of retaliatory motive)