Austin v. Cain, 660 F.3d 880

In 2003, law enforcement conducted a sting operation outside a Louisiana restaurant, resulting in Austin attempting to flee in his SUV and nearly striking officers.
Austin was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder, one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and one count of aggravated battery, receiving concurrent terms and a life sentence on count one as a habitual offender.
His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, state habeas relief was denied, and he later filed a federal habeas petition under AEDPA challenging double jeopardy among other claims.
The district court denied relief; a COA was granted only as to the double jeopardy claim, and the appeal focused on whether conviction and punishment for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and attempted first degree murder violated double jeopardy.
The Fifth Circuit declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine, and addressed the merits of the double jeopardy claim by applying Blockburger and relevant Supreme Court precedent to determine whether the offenses were the same.
The court ultimately held that no double jeopardy violation occurred because possession with intent to distribute cocaine was not a necessary element of the attempted first degree murder convictions under Louisiana law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the two offenses form the same offense under Blockburger	Austin contends the cocaine-distribution offense is the same as attempted murder.	The State argues the offenses are separate and the murder conviction can be proven without the distribution element.	No double jeopardy; offenses are distinct under Blockburger.
Whether the evidence supports attempted first degree murder independent of cocaine distribution	Austin asserts the murder conviction cannot stand without relying on cocaine distribution as an element.	The State contends there was sufficient proof of specific intent to kill officers (A(2)) regardless of distribution.	Sufficient evidence supports murder convictions without requiring cocaine distribution as an element.
Whether the concurrent sentence doctrine applies to bar federal review	Austin argues the doctrine should apply to pretermit federal habeas review.	The State urges dismissal or limited relief under the doctrine.	Declined to apply the concurrent sentence doctrine; federal review proceeded.
AEDPA standard of review and reasonableness of state court decision	Austin asserts the state court decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.	The State contends the decision was reasonable under AEDPA.	The state court decision was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court law.

Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) (blockburger and same-offense concepts discussed in double jeopardy)
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (overruled Grady’s same-conduct approach; clarified Blockburger applies to offenses with alternative grounds)
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (double jeopardy limits on punishment for greater/lesser offenses)
Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (lesser-included offenses and greater offenses; multiple punishments)
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 (1980) (relationship between rape and killing in felony-murder contexts under Blockburger)
Sekou v. Blackburn, 796 F.2d 108 (1986) (Vitale framework for determining same offense in felonymurder scenarios)
Neville v. Butler, 867 F.2d 886 (1989) (vaidity of double jeopardy analysis where underlying felonies relate to murder)
Stovall, 825 F.2d 817 (1987) (concurrent sentences and collateral consequences)