Austin G. Pittman v. State of Indiana, 9 N.E.3d 179

In 2000 Pittman was convicted of Class C misdemeanor OWI (BAC ≥ .10), sentenced to 60 days (with remainder suspended) and one year supervised probation that required abstaining from alcohol and obeying laws.
In 2001 Pittman was arrested, convicted of a later Class D felony OWI, and admitted violating probation in the 2000 case; the court extended his probation and he was released in 2002.
In 2013, more than ten years after the 2000 sentence, Pittman petitioned under Indiana Code ch. 35-38-8 to restrict public access to the 2000 conviction record; the trial court denied the petition, concluding he had not satisfied obligations imposed by his sentence due to the probation violation.
Pittman appealed; the State argued the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Pittman had not served the petition on the Attorney General and State Police. The appellate court rejected that jurisdictional attack.
On the merits, the court interpreted I.C. §§ 35-38-8-3 and -4 and held Pittman was ineligible for restriction because he failed to “satisfy any other obligation imposed on the person as part of the sentence” (i.e., he violated probation by committing another OWI).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether appellate court had jurisdiction to hear Pittman's appeal after alleged improper service on State agencies	Pittman argued the trial court order was valid and appeal timely; service on the local prosecutor satisfied Criminal Rule 18	State argued petition created a new action requiring service on the AG and State Police, so trial court lacked personal jurisdiction and order was void	Court held it had jurisdiction: petition was a filing in the existing criminal case, proper service was on the prosecuting attorney, and alleged lack of trial-court personal jurisdiction does not strip appellate jurisdiction
Whether Pittman satisfied “any other obligation imposed on the person as part of the sentence” under I.C. ch. 35-38-8 and thus qualified for record restriction	Pittman contended probation violation is distinct from satisfying sentence obligations and relied on language in the later expungement statute (ch. 35-38-9) to argue supervised-release completion was not required under former ch. 35-38-8	State argued the statutory phrase includes probation terms and a subsequent conviction while on probation shows obligations were not satisfied	Court held the statutory language is clear: obligations include probation terms, and Pittman’s conviction while on probation meant he did not satisfy sentence obligations, so restriction was properly denied

State v. Sagalovsky, 836 N.E.2d 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (appellate courts may reconsider prior rulings but will not do so absent clear error of law)
LinkAmerica Corp. v. Albert, 857 N.E.2d 961 (Ind. 2006) (discussing trial-court personal jurisdiction issues on appeal)
Laflamme v. Goodwin, 911 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (example of appellate consideration of personal-jurisdiction defects)
Keesling v. Winstead, 858 N.E.2d 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (same)
Johnston v. Johnston, 825 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (same)
Randle El v. Beard, 795 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (same)
Sanders v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Brown County, 892 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (statutory interpretation is a pure question of law reviewed de novo)
Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416 (Ind. 2000) (use of legislative language to determine intent)
U.S. Steel Corp. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 951 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (give statutory words plain and ordinary meaning)
Johnson v. Morgan, 871 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (when statutory language is ambiguous, courts may consider purpose and subject matter)