Auraria Student Housing at Regency, LLC v. Campus Village Apartments, LLC, 703 F.3d 1147

Regency sues Campus Village alleging a conspiracy with the University of Colorado, Denver to monopolize student housing in violation of Sherman Act §2.
Campus Village moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) arguing its residency restriction is authorized by state policy and immune from antitrust liability.
District court applied Kay Electric Co-op v. City of Newkirk to conclude the Colorado legislation did not render the agreement sufficiently foreseeable for Parker immunity.
Campus Village appealing denial of its motion to dismiss; Regency argues this is not a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and collateral order review should not apply.
The panel analyzes whether the denial of Parker immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine (Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.).
Court ultimately dismisses Campus Village’s appeal for lack of a final appealable order under § 1291.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the denial final under §1291 or appealable as collateral order?	Regency argues the order is not final and not appealable under §1291.	Campus Village contends collateral order review is available for Parker immunity denials.	No; order is not appealable under §1291.
Does Cohen collateral order doctrine extend to private parties seeking Parker immunity?	Regency asserts collateral order review should apply to Parker immunity determinations in private-party cases.	Campus Village argues for collateral order review under Cohen.	Not; collateral order review does not extend to private parties seeking Parker immunity.
Would aggressive discovery or dignitary interests justify immediate review?	Regency contends significant discovery and public interests could warrant immediate review.	Campus Village claims broad government disruption justifies collateral review.	No; collateral review is not justified by these considerations.

Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (U.S. 1943) (state action immunity; precludes Sherman Act reach over state actions)
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (U.S. 1985) (state action immunity—foreseeability and state policy considerations)
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1980) (formalistic approval requirement for state-action immunity)
KAY Elec. Co-op v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2011) (state action immunity requires foreseeability; circuit discussion on collateral review)
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (S. Ct. 2009) (limits on collateral-order appeals; focus on breadth of doctrine)
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (U.S. 2006) (collateral order doctrine narrow; three-pronged test with emphasis on public interest)
Acoustic Sys., Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 207 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2000) (collateral order doctrine limited; private-party implications noted)
Praxair, Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609 (11th Cir. 1995) (cited for private-party treatment of Parker immunity; limited precedent)
Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001) (finality requirement for §1291; collateral review limitations noted)
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (S. Ct. 2009) (see above (listed) Mohawk citation provided here for completeness)