Augustus Light v. John Caraway
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15014
| 7th Cir. | 2014Background
- Augustus Light was convicted in 2003 of firearm possession by a felon; the PSR treated him as an Armed Career Criminal (ACCA) based on multiple prior convictions, including criminal vehicular operation, third-degree burglary, controlled-substances offense, and fleeing a peace officer in a vehicle.
- The district court applied the ACCA enhancement (Guidelines §4B1.4), raising Light’s guideline range from 120–150 months to 235–293 months and sentenced him to 235 months; the court did not specify which three priors it relied on.
- Light’s initial §2255 challenge to the ACCA enhancement failed in the sentencing district and on appeal; after Begay v. United States (2008) he sought further relief arguing his criminal vehicular operation no longer qualified as a violent felony.
- Light filed a §2241 habeas petition in the district of incarceration invoking the §2255 savings clause; the Indiana district court dismissed it as §2255 was an adequate remedy and he appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit found Light met the Davenport savings-clause criteria (statutory, retroactive decision, miscarriage of justice) but on the merits held that although Begay removed criminal vehicular operation as a predicate, Sykes (and subsequent Eighth Circuit decisions) made his fleeing-a-peace-officer conviction a qualifying violent felony, leaving the net count unchanged.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Light may proceed under §2255(e) savings clause (Davenport second prong) | Begay was a retroactive statutory interpretation decided after Light’s first §2255, so his claim was not available earlier | Government: Light could have raised claim earlier or it was not novel enough to invoke savings clause | Court: Light satisfied Davenport’s three factors; second prong met because pre-existing Eighth Circuit precedent foreclosed his claim at the time of his first §2255 |
| Whether criminal vehicular operation qualifies as an ACCA "violent felony" post-Begay | Light: Begay shows crimes requiring only recklessness (like Minnesota criminal vehicular operation) are not ACCA violent felonies | Government: Prior circuit precedent treated such offenses as crimes of violence | Held: Under Begay and Woods the Minnesota criminal vehicular operation (recklessness standard) no longer qualifies as an ACCA predicate |
| Whether fleeing a peace officer in a vehicle qualifies as an ACCA "violent felony" | Light: Minnesota statutory distinctions (simple vs. aggravated flight) make his conviction non-violent and distinguishable from Sykes | Government: Sykes and Eighth Circuit precedent (Bartel) treat felony vehicular flight as violent because of inherent risk | Held: Sykes (and Bartel) apply; Minnesota §609.487 subd.3 convictions qualify as ACCA predicates; court defers to Eighth Circuit interpretation |
| Due process / retroactivity — may the court apply Sykes retroactively against Light while applying Begay for his benefit? | Light: Applying Sykes retroactively to count his flight conviction violates due process and is unfairly retroactive given it post-dates sentencing | Government: No one-way ratchet; changes disfavorable and favorable may both apply; Sykes was a clarification, not an unexpected construction | Held: No due process bar; Sykes was a foreseeable clarification and may be applied, so the net number of ACCA predicates remains sufficient |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (statutory interpretation: reckless mens rea crimes outside ACCA residual clause)
- Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (vehicular flight is a violent felony under the ACCA)
- United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir.) (pre-Begay reading that crimes posing serious risk, even if reckless, qualify as crimes of violence)
- United States v. Bartel, 698 F.3d 658 (8th Cir.) (Minnesota vehicular flight statute qualifies as ACCA predicate following Sykes)
- United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir.) (Begay’s mens rea limitation excludes reckless offenses from ACCA residual clause)
- In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir.) (three-factor test for invoking §2255(e) savings clause)