Augustin v. SecTek, Inc.
807 F. Supp. 2d 519
E.D. Va.2011Background
- Plaintiff worked as an armed security guard for SecTek, Inc. starting February 15, 2010 under a contract with FPS to provide security at Metro Place I.
- The National Association of Special Police and Security Officers union represented Plaintiff under a CBA effective January 13, 2010; Fowler signed the CBA on SecTek’s behalf.
- On November 8, 2010, Plaintiff allegedly clocked in at 7:30, questioned by Springfield for purported falsification of FPS Form 139, and later signed back in at 7:31.
- Approximately ten minutes after starting, Plaintiff was summoned to Springfield’s office and informed he would be reported for falsifying the form; he attempted to verify times during a break and telephoned FPS to report the accusation.
- FPS officers escorted Plaintiff off the premises and he was terminated by a letter dated November 12, 2010.
- Plaintiff filed a federal complaint listing thirteen claims, but the union was not joined and relief sought included CBA, fiduciary duty, defamation, Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, fraud, tortious interference, wrongful discharge, and punitive damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 301 preempts and bars the CBA claim against the defendants | Plaintiff maintains the CBA governs the dispute and should allow suit in court | Defendants contend § 301 preempts and individual signatories cannot be sued | § 301 preempts and dismisses the CBA claim against all defendants |
| Whether Plaintiff’s union-fair-representation theory supports a § 301 claim despite not exhausting procedures | Plaintiff argues union breached fair representation to allow federal claim | Union breach not alleged before filing; waiver occurred | No § 301 claim because Union did not breach fair representation before litigation; waiver found |
| Whether § 301 preempts the defamation, fraud, and tort claims | Claims arise from termination and related communications | Resolution requires interpretation of the CBA; claims preempted | § 301 preempts defamation, fraud (concealment/constructive fraud), and tortious interference claims |
| Whether § 301 preempts wrongful discharge and public policy claims | Wrongful discharge claim based on public policy | Resolution entails CBA analysis; preempted | § 301 preempts wrongful discharge claim |
| Whether Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims have any viability | Plaintiff alleges rights violations | Actions by private actors do not implicate the amendments | Claims dismissed; amendments apply to government action only |
| Whether Virginia malice and punitive-damages claims survive | Plaintiff seeks malice/punitive-damages relief | Virginia law does not recognize independent malice/punitive-damages claims | Malice and punitive damages claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (U.S. 1983) (employee must exhaust union remedies; waiver and fair representation concerns)
- Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (U.S. 1965) (union/employee grievance procedures; arbitration obligation)
- Trent v. Bolger, 837 F.2d 657 (4th Cir. 1988) (cf. arbitration and § 301 preemption considerations)
- DeRay v. Larson, 283 F.Supp.2d 706 (D. Conn. 2003) (§ 301 limitations on suits against non-signatories)
- Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (U.S. 1981) (interpretation of arbitration and preemption principles under § 301)
- Barbe v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 722 F.Supp. 1257 (D. Md. 1989) (defamation claim preempted when intertwined with CBA terms)
- Mullins v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local No. 77 AFL-CIO of Washington, D.C., 214 F.Supp.2d 655 (E.D. Va. 2002) (§ 301 preemption of state-law claims requiring CBA interpretation)
- Richmond Metro. Auth. v. McDevitt St. Bovis, Inc., 256 Va. 553, 507 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 1998) (fraud claims grounded in contract sound in contract)
- Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985) (public policy wrongful discharge claims limited by contract analysis)
- Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 1996) (Bowman lineage requires state-law roots for public-policy claims)
- Storey v. Patient First Corp., 207 F.Supp.2d 431 (E.D. Va. 2002) (Bowman-type private/public policy claim origin)