August Cassano v. Tim Shoop, 1 F.4th 458

Background

In October 1997 Cassano (an Ohio inmate serving a prior murder sentence) fatally stabbed his cellmate in prison and was indicted for aggravated murder with death specifications.
On May 14, 1998 Cassano filed pro se two contradictory motions received the same day: a Waiver of Counsel (seeking to proceed pro se) and a Motion for Appointment of Substitute Counsel (seeking different counsel); the trial court appointed public defenders and did not hold a Faretta hearing.
On September 25, 1998 Cassano moved for “co-counsel” (hybrid representation); the trial court denied self-representation and made statements that it would not allow Cassano to represent himself.
On April 23, 1999, three days before trial, after complaining that his lead counsel was unprepared, Cassano asked, “Is there any possibility I could represent myself?” The court again denied the request as not in his best interest; trial proceeded, and Cassano was convicted and sentenced to death.
State courts rejected Faretta-based claims on direct appeal; Cassano later pursued federal habeas relief. The district court denied the petition but granted a COA on several claims; the Sixth Circuit majority reversed and conditionally granted habeas relief based on Faretta violations (May 14 and April 23 invocations), with a dissent arguing AEDPA deference supported the state-court rulings.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Cassano)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether Cassano’s May 14, 1998 pro se Waiver of Counsel was a clear, unequivocal, timely Faretta invocation requiring a Faretta hearing	May 14 Waiver plainly invoked self-representation and, because the court could not determine the sequence of the two same‑day motions, the court was required to hold a Faretta hearing	The May 14 materials were contradictory (also requesting substitute counsel); Cassano acquiesced when counsel was appointed, so no unequivocal invocation required a Faretta hearing	Majority: May 14 Waiver was a clear invocation and the state court overlooked it; AEDPA deference does not apply to that claim; trial court should have held a Faretta hearing; relief warranted
Whether Cassano’s Sept 25, 1998 motion for co-counsel invoked the Faretta right	Sept. 25 motion and oral citation to Faretta meant he was seeking to represent himself	Motion expressly sought hybrid/co-counsel representation (not a request to waive counsel)	Held: Sept. 25 motion sought hybrid representation; no Faretta violation on that date (defer to Ohio Supreme Court)
Whether Cassano’s April 23, 1999 statement (“Is there any possibility I could represent myself?”) was a clear, timely, non-dilatory Faretta invocation	The April 23 query—made after counsel’s alleged unpreparedness and after the trial court had earlier foreclosed self-representation—was a clear, timely reinvocation, not a delay tactic; court’s denial violated Faretta	The statement was untimely (3 days before trial), possibly equivocal, and could be a delay tactic; Cassano abandoned the right after not pressing it	Majority: Statement was a clear and unequivocal Faretta invocation; the Ohio Supreme Court’s reasons were unreasonable under AEDPA; denial violated Faretta and requires relief
Remedy — whether habeas relief is required and scope	Violation of Faretta is structural (not harmless); conviction must be vacated unless retried	State defends finality and contends deference to state-court findings bars relief	Held: Majority conditionally grants habeas corpus and orders retrial within six months unless state dismisses; dissent would defer to state court under AEDPA and deny relief

Key Cases Cited

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognizes Sixth Amendment right to self-representation)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (limits on complaint about standby counsel; does not require reassertion of Faretta request)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA unreasonable-application standard)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (AEDPA standards for federal habeas review)
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (clarifies ambiguous/equivocal invocation standard in Miranda/counsel context)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (competence and self-representation are distinct inquiries)
Hill v. Curtin, 792 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. en banc guidance on timeliness of Faretta requests)
Moore v. Haviland, 531 F.3d 393 (defendant’s conduct post-denial does not necessarily constitute acquiescence to counsel)
Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517 (per curiam discussion of AEDPA deference; cited by dissent)