Audra Michelle Santoro v. Vito Aurelio Santoro
332553
| Mich. Ct. App. | Mar 28, 2017Background
- Parties divorced after contested proceedings over custody and property; trial court awarded plaintiff sole legal custody and included two post-judgment provisions in the divorce judgment (an attorney-fee enforcement clause and a fraudulent-forfeiture clause).
- A prior temporary order had provided joint legal custody on an interim basis.
- The trial court found an established custodial environment existed solely with plaintiff.
- Trial court concluded the parties could not cooperate on important decisions for the children, supporting sole legal custody for plaintiff.
- Defendant appealed the custody ruling (arguing a higher evidentiary burden applied) and challenged inclusion of the two non‑stipulated judgment provisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sole legal custody could be awarded by preponderance when an established custodial environment exists with plaintiff | Santoro needed only to show sole legal custody was in children’s best interests by a preponderance because she was not changing the established custodial environment | V. Santoro argued change from joint legal custody to sole legal custody necessarily altered the established custodial environment, triggering clear and convincing burden | Affirmed: court held established custodial environment is a factual inquiry separate from legal‑custody labels; because environment was found with plaintiff, preponderance standard applied and award affirmed |
| Whether the parties’ inability to cooperate justified sole legal custody | Plaintiff argued the parties’ animosity and documented communication failures made joint legal custody unworkable | Defendant argued joint custody should remain and parties could cooperate | Affirmed: record (emails, disputes over schooling, counseling, exchanges, finances) supported trial court’s finding that parents could not cooperate, so sole legal custody appropriate |
| Whether the judgment could include a mandatory attorney‑fee enforcement provision not in the settlement | Plaintiff supported enforcement language to deter noncompliance | Defendant opposed additional mandatory-fee language in the judgment | Vacated: court held attorney fees are allowed only by statute, rule, contract, or discrete contempt/court‑rule discretion; the provision improperly stripped future courts of discretion and was not part of the parties’ contract |
| Whether the judgment could include an automatic fraudulent‑forfeiture clause awarding undisclosed assets to the other party | Plaintiff relied on such language to address concealment | Defendant opposed reopening property division with an automatic forfeiture rule | Vacated: court held the clause would permit piecemeal relitigation and impose an automatic forfeiture rule rejected by the Supreme Court in Sands; relief for fraud must proceed under court rules (MCR 2.612), not an open-ended forfeiture clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Kubicki v. Sharpe, 306 Mich. App. 525 (discusses standards of review for custody decisions)
- Pierron v. Pierron, 486 Mich. 81 (explains burden of proof when proposed custody change affects an established custodial environment)
- Sands v. Sands, 442 Mich. 30 (rejects automatic forfeiture rule for concealed marital assets; equitable discretion required)
- Reed v. Reed, 265 Mich. App. 131 (attorney fees are allowed only by statute, court rule, contract, or recognized exception)
- Berger v. Berger, 277 Mich. App. 700 (defines established custodial environment and explains temporary orders do not control that factual inquiry)