Audie Wilson v. State of Indiana
4 N.E.3d 670
Ind. Ct. App.2014Background
- In June 2011, defendant Audie Wilson (who sometimes used the nickname “Mike”) picked up 15‑year‑old C.C. to wash cars, later offered goods in exchange for sexual acts, and took C.C. to a house where he performed oral sex and attempted anal intercourse. C.C. reported the incident and police were contacted.
- State charged Wilson with two counts of Sexual Misconduct with a Minor (Class B and Class C felonies) and Attempted Sexual Misconduct with a Minor (Class B felony).
- At trial Wilson admitted using the nickname “Mike”; on cross‑examination the State questioned other aliases he had used (e.g., “Mr. CEO,” denied using some names), over defense objection.
- Wilson tendered a jury instruction that the defense is that he reasonably believed the victim was at least 16 and that the State must prove he did not hold that belief beyond a reasonable doubt; the court instead gave Instruction 23, which stated that if the defendant proved the reasonable‑belief defense by a preponderance, he must be found not guilty.
- Wilson was convicted on all counts and appealed, arguing (1) abuse of discretion in admitting alias evidence and (2) fundamental error in Instruction 23 for shifting the burden of proof.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Wilson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether cross‑examination about Wilson’s use of aliases was admissible | Wilson opened the door by testifying to the nickname “Mike,” making inquiry into other names permissible and relevant | Admission was unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded under Evid. R. 403/404(b) | Admission was not an abuse of discretion: D opened the door; nicknames carried no criminal implication |
| Whether Final Instruction 23 improperly shifted burden to defendant on the reasonable‑belief defense | The statutory exception is an affirmative defense; the defendant bears initial burden by preponderance to prove it, so the instruction was proper | The instruction shifted burden unlawfully and violated due process because knowledge of victim’s age is an element that State must disprove beyond a reasonable doubt | No fundamental error: the statute places the reasonable‑belief clause after the offense definition making it an affirmative defense; Instruction 23 was permissible |
Key Cases Cited
- VanPatten v. State, 986 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. 2013) (standards for appellate review of evidentiary rulings)
- Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185 (Ind. 1996) (caution against unnecessary or unproved use of aliases creating connotation of criminality)
- Moon v. State, 823 N.E.2d 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding the reasonable‑belief exception is an affirmative defense that defendant must prove by preponderance)
- Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 2012) (test for whether a statutory exception is a material element or an affirmative defense)
- Jackson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 147 (Ind. 2000) (principle that a defendant may ‘open the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence)