Aubrey v. Koppes
975 F.3d 995
10th Cir.2020Background
- Kimberly Aubrey worked for the Weld County Clerk and Recorder; she developed posterior reversible encephalopathy syndrome (PRES) in Dec. 2014, was hospitalized and rehabilitated, and recovered faster than initially expected.
- Aubrey exhausted 12 weeks of FMLA but the County kept her position open without pay; Clerk Koppes had discretion to extend leave and did so, but the County later scheduled a pre-termination meeting on April 16, 2015 with <24 hours’ notice.
- At the meeting Aubrey said she might be able to return with accommodations: (1) brief additional time to obtain a neurologist’s fitness-for-duty certification, (2) retraining, or (3) reassignment to an open Office Tech II position; she was not given the County’s usual medical form or time to obtain documentation.
- The County terminated Aubrey effective April 20, 2015; she was cleared to return by a neurologist on June 4, 2015 and the temporary employee remained in Aubrey’s slot through mid-June.
- Aubrey sued under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act alleging failure to accommodate, disability discrimination, and retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment for the County; the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to accommodate | Aubrey requested plausible accommodations (short additional leave, retraining, reassignment) and County failed to engage in the interactive process | County had legitimate need to fill the post and could not wait indefinitely; Aubrey lacked required medical certification by the hearing | Reversed: triable issues exist — jury could find County failed to engage in the interactive process and accommodations were plausible |
| Disability discrimination (disparate treatment) | Termination was based on disability and County’s stated reasons were inconsistent/false (misstated limitations, rushed process) | Termination was for non-discriminatory reasons: inability to perform essential functions and undue hardship to keep position open | Reversed: plaintiff raised sufficient evidence of pretext and discriminatory animus to survive summary judgment |
| Retaliation for requesting accommodation | Firing shortly after accommodation request shows retaliation | County fired for inability to perform job and operational necessity, not because she requested accommodations | Affirmed: plaintiff failed to show employer’s reason was pretext for retaliatory motive |
| Employer duty to engage in interactive process | Plaintiff: County’s conduct (short notice, no follow-up, no medical form) shows failure to engage | County: the April 16 meeting satisfied required process; decision based on lack of fitness-for-duty certification | Court: duty exists; factual record permits jury to find County failed to engage in good-faith interactive process |
Key Cases Cited
- Lincoln v. BNSF Ry., 900 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2018) (framework for ADA failure-to-accommodate elements and burdens)
- Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) (interactive process requirement and guidance on reasonable accommodations)
- US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (standards for assessing facial reasonableness of accommodations)
- Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999) (reconciling sworn disability-benefits statements with ADA claims)
- Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 2017) (leave can be a reasonable accommodation; burden-shifting on accommodation reasonableness)
- Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906 (10th Cir. 2004) (interactive dialogue requires good-faith communications)
- Osborne v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 798 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2015) (analysis of reasonable-accommodation proof and burdens)
- Rascon v. US W. Commc’ns, Inc., 143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998) (interpretation of disability-benefit definitions vis-à-vis ADA claims)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for discriminatory-animus claims)
