Atterbury v. United States Marshals Service
941 F.3d 56
| 2d Cir. | 2019Background
- Atterbury and Hauschild were Court Security Officers (CSOs) employed by Akal Security under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) containing a "just cause" termination clause; Akal performed investigations into misconduct allegations.
- Akal contracted with the United States Marshals Service (USMS) to provide CSOs; the Akal–USMS contract reserves to USMS the right to determine a contractor employee's "suitability" to serve as a CSO.
- USMS concluded both CSOs should be removed from performing under the Akal–USMS contract, sent form letters declining to adopt Akal’s investigative findings and ordering removal, but provided no detailed reasons or identification of which findings it rejected.
- Akal terminated each CSO after USMS denied Akal/employee appeals; Atterbury challenged his termination in the W.D.N.Y.; Hauschild challenged his termination in the S.D.N.Y.
- The district courts reached opposite conclusions about whether the CBA’s "just cause" clause created a constitutionally protected property interest and whether USMS provided constitutionally adequate process; the Second Circuit consolidated the appeals.
- The Second Circuit held both CSOs had a protected property interest in continued CSO employment and that USMS’s removal procedures (lack of stated reasons and identifying evidence/hearing when facts were disputed) failed to satisfy procedural due process; the cases were remanded to USMS for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the CBA "just cause" clause create a constitutionally protected property interest in continued CSO employment? | Atterbury/Hauschild: yes — the CBA’s "no termination without just cause" creates a protectable entitlement. | USMS: no — USMS’s contractual "suitability" reservation and the CBA’s "without recourse" sentence negate any property interest. | Held: Yes. The CBA’s unambiguous "just cause" provision creates a protected property interest; neither the "without recourse" language nor the Akal–USMS suitability clause nullifies that interest. |
| Can the Akal–USMS contract’s reservation of suitability determinations override the CBA’s "just cause" protection? | Atterbury/Hauschild: no — employer/agency contract cannot abrogate employee’s bargained-for just-cause rights. | USMS: yes — the Akal–USMS contract vests USMS with final suitability discretion. | Held: No. Stein controls — a third-party contract reservation cannot be read to obliterate the employee’s bargained-for property interest. |
| Did USMS provide constitutionally adequate procedural due process before removing CSOs from the CSO program? | Atterbury/Hauschild: no — USMS failed to state reasons, identify rejected findings, or provide meaningful opportunity to confront disputed evidence; hearing required where facts were contested. | USMS: process provided (investigation by Akal, opportunities to submit statements, post-termination responses) was sufficient; no full adversarial hearing required. | Held: No. Where facts were disputed and USMS gave no explanation or identified evidence, the process was constitutionally deficient under Mathews v. Eldridge balancing. |
| Appropriate remedy? | Atterbury/Hauschild: remand to agency for further proceedings to afford required process. | USMS: (sought affirmance or narrower relief). | Held: Remedy is remand under the APA to USMS for further proceedings consistent with the opinion (procedural reconsideration). |
Key Cases Cited
- Stein v. Bd. of the City of New York, 792 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1986) (private employment contract "for cause" clause can create a protected property interest even where employer has a contract with a third party).
- Atterbury v. United States Marshals Serv., 805 F.3d 398 (2d Cir. 2015) (panel decision recognizing contractor-employee property-interest theory and reversing dismissal on jurisdictional grounds).
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (framework for balancing private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, and governmental interest in determining required process).
- Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2007) (concluding a private contract "just cause" termination clause can create a constitutional property interest for CSOs).
- Abramson v. Pataki, 278 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2002) (recognizing property interests arising from removal-only-for-cause provisions).
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (establishing limits on direct constitutional damages actions; court declined to expand Bivens remedy here).