15 F.4th 848
8th Cir.2021Background
- In 2009 FHFA’s director resigned and Edward DeMarco served as Acting Director for ~4 years under the statutory acting-official provision; a presidential nomination for a permanent director stalled.
- During DeMarco’s tenure FHFA (as conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and Treasury executed a third amendment to the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, including the “Net Worth Sweep” that effectively eliminated common shareholders’ value.
- Three shareholders sued, alleging violations of the Appointments Clause, the separation of powers (removal restriction), and the nondelegation doctrine under the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4617.
- The district court dismissed for lack of standing and on the merits. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the case in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Collins v. Yellen.
- The court held shareholders have Article III standing for retrospective relief, rejected Appointments Clause-based relief because of the de facto officer doctrine and ratification, found the statutory removal restriction unconstitutional, and upheld the statute against a nondelegation challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge third amendment | Shareholders suffered concrete injury traceable to the third amendment and can obtain retrospective relief | FHFA argued lack of traceability, mootness by later amendment, and succession-bar to relief | Standing exists for retrospective but not prospective relief (Collins controls) |
| Validity of Acting Director’s tenure; remedy for Appointments defect | DeMarco overstayed a permissible acting term; his acts are invalid and require relief | De facto officer doctrine and subsequent directors’ ratification validate actions | De facto doctrine bars relief; ratification cures any defect; no appointment-based voiding of the amendment |
| Separation of powers: removal restriction on FHFA Director | Removal restriction (for-cause) unlawfully limits President’s removal power and voids actions taken under it | FHFA argued removal limits permissible under precedent and do not require relief here | For-cause removal restriction violates separation of powers; remanded to determine whether shareholders suffered compensable retrospective harm |
| Nondelegation: 12 U.S.C. § 4617 delegation | Statute gives FHFA unacceptably broad discretion without intelligible principle | Statute supplies clear conservatorship goals and standards (rehabilitate, preserve/conserve assets) | Delegation meets intelligible-principle standard; nondelegation claim dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021) (Supreme Court decision governing standing, ratification, and remedy questions)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requirements)
- Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995) (de facto officer doctrine)
- Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) (historical roots of de facto officer doctrine)
- Selia Law, LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (limits on removal restrictions for single-director independent agencies)
- Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (intelligible-principle standard for nondelegation)
- Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (delegation and intelligible principle)
- National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (example of broad-but-sufficient intelligible principle)
- Saxton v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 901 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2018) (Eighth Circuit analysis upholding statutory conservatorship delegation)
