Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland v. Town of Clarkstoawn, 88 F.4th 344

Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland (ABY) contracted in 2018 to buy Grace Baptist Church property to open an Orthodox Jewish girls' school and sought tax-exempt REAC bonds and private financing.
Town Supervisor George Hoehmann and a local group (CUPON) publicly opposed the project; the Town Building Inspector denied ABY’s permit (Jan. 11, 2019), citing code/variance issues.
ABY appealed to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA); the ZBA imposed a survey requirement, then repeatedly failed to schedule a hearing and, by letter on July 9, 2019, informed ABY it would not entertain the appeal and refunded the fee.
Investors Bank withdrew its loan commitment; Grace Church terminated the purchase contract; the Town later bought the property.
ABY sued in SDNY asserting RLUIPA, §1983, §1985, New York constitutional claims, and tortious interference; the district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) land-use claims unripe and (2) lost-contract injury not traceable to the Town defendants.
The Second Circuit reversed, holding the ZBA’s refusal amounted to de facto finality for ripeness and that ABY plausibly alleged traceable injury for standing on the tortious-interference claim, and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ripeness of land-use and civil-rights claims (finality of ZBA action)	ZBA’s July 9 letter declining to entertain the appeal constituted de facto finality; nothing more was required for judicial review	No final decision; Grace’s contract termination revoked ABY’s status and the appeal was effectively not ripe	ZBA’s refusal and conduct amounted to de facto finality; claims were ripe for review
Article III standing — traceability for tortious-interference (lost contract)	Town’s public opposition, permit denial, delays, and coordination with CUPON predictably caused financiers and seller to withdraw; injury is fairly traceable	Loss resulted from independent third-party decisions and ABY’s contract terms; Town lacked coercive or determinative effect	Allegations plausibly show Town actions had a predictable effect on third parties; de facto causality suffices for standing

Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (finality requirement for land-use takings/ripeness)
Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (ripeness balancing for zoning disputes)
Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 141 S. Ct. 2226 (Sup. Ct. 2021) (de facto finality can satisfy finality requirement)
Vill. Green at Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip, 43 F.4th 287 (2d Cir. 2022) (finality requirement is modest; de facto finality sufficient)
Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, 769 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014) (ripeness in land-use contexts)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (standing: injury must be fairly traceable to defendant’s conduct)
Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (reliance on predictable effect of government action on third parties)
Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2016) (Article III causation requires less than proximate cause)