Aston v. Tapco International Corp., 631 F. App'x 292

Background

Aston, a long‑time Tapco employee, suffered a heart attack in May 2010 and took FMLA (12 weeks) plus short‑term disability (14 weeks) — 26 weeks total; Tapco did not have a policy to hold positions beyond FMLA.
Aston’s doctor completed a form stating Aston was continuously disabled through Jan 1, 2011 and later (after a call) amended restrictions to permit immediate return with a 30‑pound lifting limit; the doctor testified he believed Aston could not perform many physical duties through January.
Tapco’s HR (Brisson) learned of Aston’s impending ICD surgery, researched ICDs, told Aston the company had “pretty much decided to terminate” him, and advised long‑term disability; Aston was terminated effective Nov 22, 2010 with a letter stating Tapco could not accept any release other than full duty.
Aston requested reinstatement in Dec 2010; Tapco did not respond until May 31, 2012, when it made an unconditional offer to reinstate Aston consistent with the 30‑pound restriction; Aston rejected the delayed offer on June 22, 2012 and later sued under the ADA, Michigan PWDCRA, and FMLA.
The district court granted Tapco summary judgment and denied Aston partial summary judgment; Aston appealed his ADA and PWDCRA claims; the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Tapco and denied sanctions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Aston was a “qualified individual” under the ADA (able to perform essential functions with/without accommodation)	Aston argued he could be qualified with accommodation (return by Jan 1, 2011; 30‑lb restriction)	Tapco relied on Dr. Karabajakian’s statements that Aston could not perform many essential physical duties at time of termination	Held: Not qualified at time of discharge; summary judgment for Tapco because Aston could not perform essential functions
Failure to accommodate vs. discrimination (burden to propose accommodation)	Aston argued the court erred by treating discrimination and failure‑to‑accommodate identically and imposing accommodation proposal burden	Tapco argued plaintiff still must show he was otherwise qualified (with or without accommodation)	Held: No error; Aston still had to show he was otherwise qualified and failed to do so
Discriminatory discharge (was termination because of disability)	Aston contended termination was discriminatory	Tapco admitted termination was due to disability but defended on undue‑hardship/reasonableness grounds	Held: Tapco terminated for disability, but additional leave/accommodation (indefinite leave) would be unreasonable/undue hardship; summary judgment affirmed
Backpay mitigation after defendant’s reinstatement offer	Aston argued Tapco’s delayed/unconditional offer was in bad faith so he should recover backpay after June 22, 2012	Tapco argued its unconditional reinstatement tolls backpay liability and plaintiff failed to mitigate after rejecting offer	Held: Court precluded backpay after June 22, 2012 for mitigation reasons; Sixth Circuit declined to decide good‑faith exception given failure to establish prima facie case

Key Cases Cited

Villegas v. Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for summary judgment in ADA context)
Keith v. County of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918 (6th Cir. 2013) (elements of ADA prima facie case)
Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg. Inc., 485 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2007) (employee not qualified where cannot perform essential functions even with accommodation)
Hoskins v. Oakland Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 2000) (analysis of essential functions and undue hardship)
Walsh v. United Parcel Serv., 201 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (employer not required to keep job open indefinitely; prolonged leave can be unreasonable accommodation)
Griffith v. Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376 (6th Cir. 1998) (qualified‑individual inquiry is at time of discharge)
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219 (U.S. 1982) (employer may toll backpay liability by an unconditional offer of reinstatement)