Aspen American Insurance Company v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261

Tessco hired Landstar Ranger, Inc. (a transportation broker) to arrange interstate shipment of expensive cargo; Landstar selected a registered carrier, L&P Transportation.
A fraudster impersonating the registered carrier ("James") collected the shipment after Landstar failed to follow its carrier‑verification protocol; the cargo was stolen.
Tessco’s insurer, Aspen American Insurance Co., paid Tessco’s claim and sued Landstar in Florida state court (removed/dismissal proceedings in federal court) for negligent selection of the motor carrier.
District court dismissed Aspen’s negligence claims as expressly preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), and held the statute’s safety exception, § 14501(c)(2), inapplicable.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo whether the FAAAA preempts broker negligence claims based on carrier selection and whether the safety exception saves those claims.
The court affirmed: Aspen’s negligence claims are preempted as relating to a broker’s service in arranging transportation, and the safety exception does not apply because the claims are not sufficiently "with respect to motor vehicles."

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the FAAAA expressly preempt Aspen’s Florida negligence claims challenging a broker’s selection of a motor carrier?	Aspen: general common‑law negligence claims are not preempted and do not "relate to" a broker’s service within the Act.	Landstar: claims target the broker’s core service (arranging/selecting a carrier) and thus are "related to" a broker’s service under §14501(c)(1).	Held: Preempted — the negligent‑selection claim has a connection to a broker’s service arranging transportation, so it falls within §14501(c)(1).
Does the FAAAA safety exception (§14501(c)(2)) save Aspen’s negligence claims?	Aspen: negligence enforces a safety‑responsive standard and so is within the state’s safety regulatory authority and exempt.	Landstar: even if negligence is safety‑related, the exception applies only to laws "with respect to motor vehicles," and this claim is one step removed from motor vehicles.	Held: Exception does not apply — while the negligence standard can be safety‑related, Aspen’s claims are not "with respect to motor vehicles" (they are too indirect/attenuated).

Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) ("related to" construed broadly for preemption under the ADA)
Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008) (applied Morales to interpret FAAAA preemption)
Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251 (2013) (recognized limiting phrase "with respect to the transportation of property")
City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424 (2002) (safety exception requires law to be "genuinely responsive to safety concerns")
Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020) (held negligent‑carrier‑selection claims tied to personal‑injury accidents can fall within the safety exception)
Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273 (2014) (common‑law claims constitute "other provision having the force and effect of law" for preemption analysis)
CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993) (statutory construction focuses on plain wording when assessing preemptive intent)