Aspen American Insurance Company v. Interstate Warehouseing, Inc.
90 N.E.3d 440
Ill.2018Background
- Aspen (insurer for Eastern Fish) sued Interstate Warehousing (Indiana corp.) in Cook County after a roof collapse at Interstate’s Michigan warehouse destroyed insured goods; Aspen seeks subrogation recovery.
- Complaint alleged Interstate “maintain[s] a facility in or near Chicago” and attached correspondence, the warehousing contract (listing Fort Wayne, IN as corporate office), and Interstate’s website masthead listing eight warehouses including Joliet, IL.
- Interstate moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Daimler, conceding it did business in Illinois via its Joliet warehouse but arguing that was insufficient for general jurisdiction because it is incorporated and headquartered in Indiana.
- Aspen supplied an Illinois Secretary of State filing showing Interstate registered to do business in Illinois; no jurisdictional discovery was taken.
- The trial court denied dismissal; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and reversed, holding Illinois courts lack general jurisdiction over Interstate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Illinois has constitutional general personal jurisdiction over Interstate | General jurisdiction exists because Interstate has continuous, systematic business in Illinois (Joliet warehouse, registered to do business) | Daimler requires a defendant be "essentially at home" in the forum (place of incorporation or principal place of business) except in rare, exceptional circumstances | No; Aspen failed to show Interstate is "essentially at home" in Illinois — incorporated and headquartered in Indiana and no exceptional circumstances shown |
| Whether Illinois' long-arm statute subsection (c) authorizes jurisdiction | Subsection (c) permits jurisdiction on any basis allowed by federal due process; continuous business suffices | Federal due process (Daimler) limits general jurisdiction to where a corporation is at home; continuous business alone is insufficient | Subsection (c) cannot be used to override Daimler; plaintiff did not meet the "at home" standard |
| Whether subsection (b)(4) (doing business) permits general jurisdiction | Doing business in Illinois (Joliet warehouse) supports jurisdiction under (b)(4) | Applying (b)(4) to confer all-purpose jurisdiction contradicts Daimler and fails federal due process | No; (b)(4) cannot constitutionally be applied to create general jurisdiction absent "at home" showing |
| Whether registering to do business / appointing a registered agent in Illinois amounts to consent to general jurisdiction | Registration and appointment of an agent constitute consent to Illinois courts and obviate due process concerns | The Business Corporation Act does not contain language evidencing consent to general jurisdiction; registration does not waive federal due process limits | No; registration and having a registered agent do not amount to consent to general jurisdiction for claims unrelated to Illinois activities |
Key Cases Cited
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (established minimum contacts/due process framework for personal jurisdiction)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (general jurisdiction requires a corporation be "essentially at home" in the forum)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (distinguishes specific vs. general jurisdiction; continuous activity alone insufficient)
- Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (example of exceptional circumstances rendering a corporation at home in a forum)
- Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (specific jurisdiction principles and relatedness inquiry)
- Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (early articulation of due process limits on personal jurisdiction)