Asma Said v. Sugar Creek Country Club, Inc., 14-17-00079-CV

Asma Said attended a wedding at Sugar Creek Country Club, self-parked, and later left the clubhouse around 11:00 p.m.; she stepped off a tiled patio onto a sloping driveway and fell.
Said testified she saw a painted curb and knew she was stepping down but claimed the curb was higher than anticipated (she later stated it was 11 inches) and alleged it was an unreasonably dangerous condition.
Sugar Creek produced an engineer’s affidavit that (a) varying curb heights on the site are consistent with common construction practice, (b) the curb is painted red and is visually distinct from the patio, and (c) the curb complies with applicable codes.
The club’s general manager averred the curb had not caused prior reported incidents and there were no complaints during his employment.
Said sought a continuance seven days before the summary-judgment hearing to obtain incident reports and depose Sugar Creek’s expert; the trial court denied the continuance and granted Sugar Creek’s traditional summary judgment.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding the curb did not pose an unreasonable risk as a matter of law and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether curb posed an unreasonably dangerous condition	Curb ~11" ("twice normal") and gradual height change without warning made it unreasonably dangerous	Curb visible, painted, composed of different materials from patio, common in construction, no code violations, no prior incidents	Curb did not pose an unreasonable risk as a matter of law; summary judgment proper
Whether condition was open and obvious	Said: height and slope were not open/obvious when looking down	Sugar Creek: step was visible and painted; Said admitted she saw the step	Court did not reach issue after finding no unreasonable risk
Denial of continuance for additional discovery	Said: needed incident reports and expert deposition to oppose MSJ	Sugar Creek: discovery largely addressed and plaintiff delayed in seeking materials/deposition	Trial court did not clearly abuse discretion denying continuance
Whether summary judgment improperly dismissed exemplary-goods (gross negligence) claim	Said: court granted relief beyond motion because gross negligence not addressed	Sugar Creek: exemplary damages are derivative of negligence; dismissal of negligence bars exemplary damages	Dismissal of exemplary damages was proper because it was dependent on negligence claim

Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (standard review of summary judgment)
Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2010) (premises-liability duty and invitee standard)
Brinson Ford, Inc. v. Alger, 228 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. 2007) (condition clearly marked and compliant with safety standards can defeat premise-liability claim)
Seideneck v. Cal Bayreuther Assocs., 451 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1970) (accident alone does not prove an unreasonably dangerous condition)
Thoreson v. Thompson, 431 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1968) (mere occurrence of accident is insufficient to show unreasonable risk)
Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) (factors for evaluating continuance for additional discovery)