41 Cal.App.5th 850
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Plaintiffs (Asian Americans Advancing Justice—LA, Asian Law Caucus, ACLU-NC) challenged the California Secretary of State’s implementation of Elections Code § 14201, which requires posting and availability of facsimile (sample) ballots in non‑English languages at certain polling places.
- § 14201 directs the Secretary to determine, on a county and precinct basis, whether 3% or more of voting‑age residents in a county or precinct are members of a “single language minority” with limited English proficiency; if so, facsimile ballots in that language must be provided. The statute also exempts counties that are covered by the federal Voting Rights Act (VRA).
- The Secretary (Padilla) has for decades: (1) made determinations at the precinct level (not county‑wide), and (2) relied on the VRA’s definitional/regulatory framework and the Census/Attorney General coverage determinations (published in the Federal Register) to identify which language groups are covered.
- Plaintiffs argued the Secretary must apply the 3% trigger county‑wide (not precinct‑by‑precinct), and that the Secretary unlawfully limited state coverage to the small set of languages identified in the federal coverage list (and had effectively adopted the federal 5% threshold).
- The trial court denied the writ; the Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part: it upheld the Secretary’s precinct‑based approach and his reliance on the VRA’s definitional language, but held the Secretary erred by treating the federal coverage determinations (and the VRA’s 5% coverage threshold) as the operative state list/threshold for § 14201.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Scope: Must the Secretary apply § 14201 county‑wide when any precinct in the county meets 3%? | §14201 requires county‑wide coverage; precinct focus renders “county” surplusage and denies many LEP voters state protection. | Statute permits precinct determinations; legislative history and longstanding administrative practice support precinct focus. | Held: Precinct‑based determinations are consistent with §14201 and legislative intent; Secretary’s practice valid. |
| 2) May the Secretary rely on the VRA’s definitional/regulatory framework for “language minorities”/“single language minority”? | Reliance on VRA definition excludes many languages prevalent in CA and is inconsistent with state remedial purpose. | §14201 uses the same terminology; state law is ambiguous and Legislature knew of federal definitions; reliance is reasonable. | Held: Secretary may look to the VRA’s definitional language and implementing regulations to interpret “single language minority.” |
| 3) May the Secretary treat the federal Federal‑Register coverage list as the operative list of languages for state mandatory coverage? | Secretary improperly confined state mandatory coverage to languages on the federal coverage list, excluding other LEP language groups. | Using the federal list is administratively efficient and consistent with the VRA framework. | Held: Error — Secretary cannot simply adopt the federal coverage list as the exclusive operative list for state law; he must apply the state statute (3% test) to determine state coverage. |
| 4) Did the Secretary unlawfully import the VRA’s 5% coverage threshold into § 14201, supplanting the state 3% threshold? | Secretary effectively applied the federal 5% threshold by relying on federal coverage determinations. | He relied on federal determinations for operational guidance; thought they supplied an operational definition. | Held: Error — Secretary may use federal definitional guidance, but may not import the VRA’s 5% coverage threshold; state law’s 3% threshold controls for mandatory state coverage. |
Key Cases Cited
- South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (U.S. 1966) (describing the Voting Rights Act’s remedial purpose)
- Alhambra v. County of Los Angeles, 55 Cal.4th 707 (Cal. 2012) (mandamus review and agency discretion standards)
- El Dorado Oil Works v. McColgan, 34 Cal.2d 731 (Cal. 1950) (administrative practice and legislative acquiescence inform statutory interpretation)
- Nadaf‑Rahrov v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc., 166 Cal.App.4th 952 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (when statute mirrors federal language, Legislature likely intended the same meaning)
- Ailanto Properties, Inc. v. City of Half Moon Bay, 142 Cal.App.4th 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (statutory construction steps and use of legislative history)
- Bernard v. City of Oakland, 202 Cal.App.4th 1553 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (principles of statutory construction regarding plain meaning and legislative intent)