Ashoor Rasho v. Willard Elyea
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 8132
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Rasho, an IDOC inmate with a long history of serious mental illness, was housed at Pontiac in 2003 and placed in the Mental Health Unit (MHU).
- In April 2004 he was transferred out of the MHU after self-mutilation; later, he was moved to the North Segregation Unit (NSU) in November 2006.
- Rasho alleged the transfer was retaliation for grievances against staff, leading to more than 20 months of allegedly inadequate mental health care.
- Dr. Massa (Pontiac psychiatrist) and Dr. Garlick (Psychology Services Administrator) recommended the transfer; both approved by others and contracted through Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
- Rasho claimed that after transfer he suffered worsened mental health and self-harm, while experts later criticized the NSU as harmful and the MHU as underutilized for his needs.
- The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants; Rasho appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Massa and Garlick violated the Eighth Amendment by transferring Rasho for retaliation | Rasho, citing statements by Massa/Garlick, shows retaliation for grievances. | Transfer based on medical judgment, not retaliatory motive; Rasho venues lack direct causation. | Yes, triable issue; retaliation could have been motive and caused harm. |
| Whether Elyea, Blank, or Jones can be held liable for supervisory or policy failures | These defendants failed to supervise or indemnify proper care, contributing to violation. | No personal responsibility or causal link shown; deference to medical judgment. | Affirmed summary judgment for Elyea, Blank, and Jones. |
| Whether the district court erred in applying §1997e(e) (physical injury requirement) to bar claims | Evidence of self-mutilation satisfies physical injury requirement; causation shown. | No physical injury shown; therefore claim barred under §1997e(e). | District court erred in relying on lack of physical injury; issue remains triable. |
| Whether Dr. Massa and Garlick are entitled to qualified immunity | There was a genuine dispute about their mental-state and retaliatory motive. | Qualified immunity applies to private contractors ordinarily; here, not applicable if mind state disputed. | Remanded for factual determination; qualified-immunity defense not resolved. |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (U.S. Supreme Court 1976) (deliberate indifference standard in prison medical care)
- Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (two-step Eighth Amendment analysis; factual disputes on state of mind preclude summary judgment)
- Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2011) (cost or administrative convenience cannot substitute for medical judgment)
- Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2008) (professional judgment standard for medical decisions; departure needed to show indifference)
- Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012) (prison officials can rely on medical professionals' judgment)
- Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800 (7th Cir. 2016) (private contractors in prison healthcare can be denied qualified immunity)