Ashley v. the State
331 Ga. App. 794
Ga. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant Thad Lee Ashley was convicted by a jury of kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, entering an automobile, and criminal trespass after an incident in September 2011 at a mobile-home park.
- Facts: Ashley (subject to a trespass warning) grabbed seven-year-old K.L. by the wrist and pulled her from her family’s unlocked minivan; K.L. broke free and ran to her mother. Ashley then reached into the minivan toward two-year-old B.L., who scrambled away, and fled when the mother yelled.
- Ashley gave inconsistent explanations (drug use, believed the van belonged to his father).
- The State also introduced several prior incidents from the summer of 2011 in which Ashley behaved in an unsettling or annoying way around children at the same trailer-park pool.
- Ashley appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for kidnapping/attempted kidnapping (asportation and intent) and that the trial court erred by admitting character/similar-transaction evidence.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the kidnapping and attempted kidnapping convictions because admission of the prior-conduct evidence improperly placed Ashley’s character at issue, but held the remaining evidence would support retrial (convictions as to other offenses stand subject to retrial).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency — asportation for kidnapping of K.L. | State: slight movement (pulling K.L. from van) suffices under OCGA § 16-5-40; movement not merely incidental because it made commission of entering-automobile offense easier. | Ashley: movement was incidental to entering an automobile, so no kidnapping asportation. | Held: Asportation satisfied — slight movement suffices and here movement was integral to felony (entering automobile) and made the felony easier. |
| Sufficiency — intent to kidnap/attempted kidnap | State: facts (grabbing, carrying, reentering to grab B.L., flight, inconsistent statements) allow inference of criminal intent. | Ashley: lacked requisite criminal intent; claimed mistake (thought van belonged to father) and intoxication. | Held: Evidence supported jury inference of criminal intent; jury could reject explanations; voluntary intoxication not an excuse. |
| Admissibility of similar-transaction/character evidence | State: prior incidents at pool were similar transactions showing intent (and/or part of a course of conduct culminating in the crime). | Ashley: prior incidents were noncriminal, showed only unpleasant character/bent of mind and thus were inadmissible to prove intent. | Held: Reversed — trial court abused discretion admitting prior-conduct evidence because it only tended to show character (annoying behavior) and did not show same mental state; not intrinsic or part of same transaction. |
| Prejudice / Harmless-error | State: admission harmless given other evidence. | Ashley: admission likely affected jury choice of kidnapping over lesser offenses. | Held: Error was not harmless — significant character evidence could have contributed to verdict; reversal required. |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review) (establishes conviction upheld if any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond reasonable doubt)
- Lively v. State, 262 Ga. 510 (retrial permitted after reversal for evidentiary error) (retrial allowed where convictions reversed for evidentiary error)
- Hammond v. State, 289 Ga. 142 (2011) (explains slight-movement asportation standard under current statute)
- Chua v. State, 289 Ga. 220 (similar-transaction evidence inadmissible when it merely raises improper character inference)
- Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650 (similar-transaction evidence offered to prove intent must show comparable mental state in extrinsic and charged acts)
- Peoples v. State, 295 Ga. 44 (extrinsic acts are inadmissible as intrinsic when they are not inextricably intertwined with charged conduct)