301 So.3d 976
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2020Background
- Krapacs, an attorney, lost a domestic-violence injunction she sought against her former boyfriend; she then published an article accusing his lawyer (Russel J. Williams) of lying to the judge. Williams hired attorney Nisha Bacchus to bring a defamation suit against Krapacs.
- Krapacs responded with multiple social-media posts and a blog post disparaging Bacchus, tagging Bacchus repeatedly, posting a meme and a photo linking to Bacchus’s firm profile, identifying Bacchus’s car model, and stating she would contact Bacchus’s former clients about malpractice claims.
- Bacchus petitioned for an injunction for protection against stalking under Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(d); the trial court entered a temporary injunction and later a final injunction restricting Krapacs’s office access, ordering removal of posts, and broadly prohibiting posts “referencing” Bacchus.
- On appeal, the Fourth District reviewed legal sufficiency de novo and whether the injunction was an unconstitutional prior restraint under the First Amendment.
- The court found Krapacs’s conduct did not meet the statutory “course of conduct” requirement for cyberstalking (only one qualifying episode—the prolonged retagging), concluded most posts were constitutionally protected speech, and held the injunction’s blanket ban on posting about Bacchus was an overbroad prior restraint.
- The injunction was reversed; the court noted Bacchus may still pursue damages actions (e.g., defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference) if the elements are met.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bacchus) | Defendant's Argument (Krapacs) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Krapacs engaged in a "course of conduct" sufficient for cyberstalking under § 784.048(1)(d) | Multiple posts, repeated tagging, and efforts to contact former clients constitute a pattern causing substantial emotional distress | The posts were discrete, mostly protected expression; only the prolonged retagging episode qualified and there was no continuity of purpose | Reversed: evidence did not show the required course of conduct; only one qualifying incident existed, so statute was not satisfied |
| Whether the injunction impermissibly restrained speech / was overbroad under the First Amendment | Narrowly tailored injunction necessary to protect safety and emotional well‑being | Blanket prohibition on posting about Bacchus is a prior restraint and overbroad; harms First Amendment rights | Reversed: injunction’s ban on posting that "references" Bacchus was an unconstitutional prior restraint and overbroad |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (injunctions cannot substitute for defamation remedies; broad bans on online commentary raise First Amendment concerns)
- Thoma v. O’Neal, 180 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (repeated tagging that forces unwanted speech can cross First Amendment protection)
- David v. Schack, 192 So. 3d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (requirements for proving multiple incidents of stalking; use of reasonable-person standard for emotional distress)
- David v. Textor, 189 So. 3d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (injunctions banning posting about a person online may be prior restraints; defamation damages remain the proper remedy)
- Vrasic v. Leibel, 106 So. 3d 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (injunctive relief is not available to prohibit defamatory or libelous statements)
- Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (U.S. 1994) (court-ordered speech bans are subject to First Amendment scrutiny; injunctions can be prior restraints)
- Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (U.S. 2010) (courts are bound by the First Amendment and must apply constitutional limits regardless of medium)
- Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (U.S. 2017) (internet and social media are important forums for protected speech)