703 F. App'x 3
D.C. Cir.2017Background
- Ashbourne was a probationary federal employee terminated by the Treasury Department after the Department found discrepancies in her resume and e-QIP submissions and inconsistent accounts about a prior employment separation at C.J. Johnson, Inc.
- The Department’s Notice of Proposed Termination described Ashbourne’s work-history statements as “misleading,” relying on documents Ashbourne herself submitted and on an affidavit from her former supervisor stating she was fired.
- Ashbourne challenged the termination in district court, asserting violations of the Privacy Act (for allegedly inaccurate records) and the Fifth Amendment (for deprivation of liberty via reputational stigma without adequate process).
- The Department gave Ashbourne notice and an opportunity to respond by submitting affidavits with counsel under the Civil Service Reform Act; when contradictions remained, the Department included both accounts in her personnel file.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the Department; the D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding Ashbourne’s Privacy Act claim was improperly recasting a personnel decision as a record-accuracy dispute and that she received adequate procedural protections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Department maintained inaccurate records in violation of the Privacy Act by labeling Ashbourne’s employment history as misleading | Ashbourne: records were inaccurate; Department should have independently verified conflicts (e.g., whether she resigned or was fired) | Treasury: records reflected discrepancies supported by documents and supervisor affidavit; plaintiff did not dispute accuracy of many records | Held: Privacy Act claim fails — plaintiff did not challenge the factual records and the Department met verification obligations; including both accounts was permissible |
| Whether the Department had a continuing duty to investigate third-party factual disputes after giving notice and an opportunity to respond | Ashbourne: Department had to take reasonable steps to verify whose account was true | Treasury: after notice and chance to respond, no duty to perform independent inquiry into all third-party matters absent notice-specific trigger | Held: No continued duty to further investigate without additional prompting; Department acted reasonably |
| Whether the termination infringed Ashbourne’s Fifth Amendment liberty interest in reputation without providing sufficient process | Ashbourne: termination stigmatized reputation and deprived her liberty without adequate opportunity to clear her name | Treasury: provided notice and chance to refute charges via affidavits with counsel per civil-service procedures | Held: Due-process claim fails — Department afforded constitutionally sufficient opportunity to clear name |
| Proper characterization of the dispute (personnel management vs. Privacy Act factual challenge) | Ashbourne: framed as factual challenge under Privacy Act | Treasury: this is a personnel-management decision not remediable as a Privacy Act accuracy claim | Held: Court treated it as an impermissible recasting of a personnel decision as a Privacy Act accuracy claim and rejected that approach |
Key Cases Cited
- Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing personnel decisions from Privacy Act factual challenges)
- Kleiman v. Dep’t of Energy, 956 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (requiring challenge to factual accuracy to prevail under the Privacy Act)
- Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, 959 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (agency must take reasonable steps to verify disputed facts)
- McCready v. Nicholson, 465 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (identifying circumstances that trigger further agency inquiry)
- Doe v. United States, 821 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (prescribing inclusion of conflicting accounts in personnel files)
- Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 763 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing stigma-plus liberty interest)
- Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (due-process requirement: opportunity to clear one’s name)
- McCormick v. District of Columbia, 752 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (due process requires notice and an effective chance to refute charges)