Asgeirsson v. Abbott
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31662
W.D. Tex.2011Background
- Plaintiffs are Texas city council members challenging the criminal provisions of Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA) § 551.144; the challenge focuses on the open-meetings regime and potential penalties for closed-meeting conduct.
- The case involves Alpine, Pflugerville, Rockport, and Wichita Falls as original plaintiff cities, later dismissed for lack of standing, leaving individual council members as plaintiffs.
- Plaintiffs allege TOMA § 551.144 is vague, overbroad, and infringes First Amendment rights by chilling speech about public matters.
- Defendants, including Texas Attorney General, contend TOMA is a disclosure law that is content-neutral and necessary to ensure open government and transparency.
- The court conducted a bench trial on November 23, 2010, after cross-motions for summary judgment, and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.
- The court ultimately held that TOMA is content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and satisfies intermediate (and alternatively strict) scrutiny; it denied declaratory relief and injunctive relief and entered judgment for the state.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is §551.144 constitutional under the First Amendment? | Asgeirsson argues it is vague/overbroad and suppresses speech. | Abbott argues it is a disclosure, content-neutral law that does not suppress speech. | Constitutional; content-neutral disclosure law. |
| Is TOMA content-based or content-neutral? | TOMA targets speech content and government suppression. | TOMA regulates disclosure of speech, not content suppression. | Content-neutral. |
| Does TOMA restrict speech based on speaker identity? | Public officials' speech is restricted more than citizens'. | Citizens retain speech rights; disclosures are necessary for transparency. | Not a violation; identity-based restriction is permissible as disclosure. |
| Is TOMA overbroad or vague on its face? | Open meetings statute chills protected speech. | Statute is narrow and provides clear prohibitions with exceptions. | Not overbroad or vague. |
| Does TOMA meet intermediate (or strict) scrutiny? | Disclosures burden protected speech too much; not narrowly tailored. | Open meetings serve compelling interests; disclosure is narrowly tailored. | Meets intermediate scrutiny; alternatively, passes strict scrutiny. |
Key Cases Cited
- Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (disclosure rules may burden speech but do not prevent it; government cannot ban speech based on corporate identity)
- Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (disclosure of petition signers may burden speech but does not prevent it; supports disclosure justification)
- Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (content-neutral regulation may be justified by secondary effects; open of channels principle)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (content neutrality and secondary effects analysis; proximities not based on content alone)
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (open regulation may be narrowly tailored despite varying degrees of restriction)
- Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990) (state open meetings issues and formal vs. informal discussions)
- Serv. Emp't Int'l Union, Local 5 v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2010) (intermediate scrutiny framework for content-neutral laws)