Asemani v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Services
418 U.S. App. D.C. 205
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff Billy G. Asemani is a federal prisoner serving a 30-year sentence who sought mandamus relief compelling USCIS to grant a hearing on the denial of his naturalization application.
- Asemani had at least three prior prisoner suits dismissed on PLRA §1915(g) grounds, triggering the PLRA’s three-strikes bar to proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) absent imminent danger of serious physical injury.
- The district court initially granted IFP but later vacated that order after the government invoked §1915(g); Asemani failed to pay the filing fee and his case was dismissed.
- Asemani argued below and on appeal that he qualified for the imminent-danger exception because he had previously been assaulted, was placed in protective custody, and faced a continuing threat from other inmates.
- The district court held Asemani’s imminent-danger allegations were untimely and unrelated to his mandamus claim; the D.C. Circuit treated the allegations as timely but held they did not show the requisite imminent danger and rejected his as-applied constitutional challenge to §1915(g).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Asemani may proceed IFP on appeal under §1915(g)’s imminent-danger exception | Asemani: prior assaults, ongoing threat in protective custody constitute imminent danger | Government: allegations untimely and insufficiently show imminent danger tied to the claim | Denied — court treated allegations as timely but found they did not establish imminent danger |
| Whether a prisoner must plead imminent-danger facts in any particular filing (timeliness/formal pleading) | Asemani: need not have alleged imminent danger in the initial complaint or IFP motion; later allegations should be considered | Government: later allegations untimely and cannot be considered | Court: prisoner need not plead in any specific document; later-filed allegations can be considered if they attest to conditions existing when suit was filed |
| Whether there must be a nexus between the imminent danger alleged and the underlying claim | Asemani: argued imminent danger qualifies regardless of relation to mandamus claim | Government: imminent-danger must relate to the claim or otherwise argued in opposition | Court: did not decide the nexus question here; resolved case on absence of imminent danger irrespective of nexus |
| Whether §1915(g) is unconstitutional as applied to Asemani’s naturalization mandamus action | Asemani: naturalization is a fundamental interest that requires fee-waiver protection | Government: naturalization is a discretionary statutory benefit; PLRA rationally furthers deterrence of meritless prisoner suits | Court: §1915(g) constitutional as applied; naturalization claim not within narrow category requiring fee waiver |
Key Cases Cited
- Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (PLRA enacted to curb prisoner flood of meritless suits)
- Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (PLRA changed availability of IFP for prisoner suits)
- Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759 (Sup. Ct. 2015) (§1915(g) requires full filing fee when three strikes exist)
- Mitchell v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (imminent-danger exception interpreted narrowly; past assaults may be insufficient)
- Pinson v. Samuels, 761 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (imminent-danger inquiry looks to conditions when action brought)
- Smith v. District of Columbia, 182 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (procedural posture guidance for prisoner IFP appeals)
- Ibrahim v. District of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (accepting prisoner’s factual allegations as true for §1915(g) inquiry)
- Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2015) (examples of allegations sufficient to show imminent danger)
- Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2010) (recent beating plus multiple threats can satisfy imminent-danger exception)
- M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (fee-waiver constitutional exception is narrow; focused on certain family-related civil cases)
- Kras v. United States, 409 U.S. 434 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (important interests like bankruptcy discharge do not automatically require fee waiver)
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (Congress has broad power over immigration and naturalization)