Arthur West v. Pierce County Council
197 Wash. App. 895
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Arthur West sued the Pierce County Council under the Open Public Meetings Act (OPMA), RCW chapter 42.30, based on a series of emails between council members and the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney about whether to challenge a referendum.
- West sought relief under RCW 42.30.120 (civil penalties) and RCW 42.30.130 (injunctions).
- The Council moved for summary judgment; the superior court ruled West lacked standing and, alternatively, that no OPMA violation occurred, and dismissed with prejudice.
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Div. II) addressed standing and the merits: it held West had statutory standing under the plain language of RCW 42.30.120/.130, adopting Division One’s analysis in West v. Seattle Port Comm’n.
- On the merits, the court applied the three-part test for electronic-communication meetings (majority participation, collective intent to transact business, and an "action"), and found no genuine issue of material fact because council members did not collectively intend to meet or transact official business.
- The court affirmed summary judgment for the Council: West has standing, but the email exchanges did not constitute an OPMA meeting or action requiring relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to sue under OPMA (RCW 42.30.120/.130) | West: OPMA expressly allows "any person" to bring actions; thus he has standing. | Council: Kirk requires more restrictive standing; West (Div. I) was wrongly decided. | Held: Statutory language governs; "any person" has standing under RCW 42.30.120/.130. |
| Whether email exchanges violated OPMA (electronic meeting) | West: Emails with prosecuting attorney amounted to a collective meeting and "action" to decide litigation strategy, violating OPMA. | Council: Emails were information-seeking, directed to the prosecutor, no collective intent to transact official business; thus no meeting/action. | Held: No genuine issue of material fact on collective intent; communications were not a meeting or action under OPMA; summary judgment proper. |
| Applicability of Kirk v. Pierce County to statutory OPMA causes of action | West: statutory text controls; Kirk addressed a different implied remedy and does not limit statutory standing. | Council: Kirk imposes general standing limits that conflict with "any person" language. | Held: Kirk addressed a different issue (voiding agency action) and does not override explicit statutory standing in RCW 42.30.120/.130. |
| Use of federal standing principles in Washington OPMA claims | West: Legislature can create standing exceptions; federal standards need not apply. | Council: Federal standing principles apply and limit standing. | Held: Legislative grant of standing controls here; federal standing principles are not dispositive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kirk v. Pierce County Fire Prot. Dist. No. 21, 95 Wn.2d 769 (1981) (addressed standing to void agency action for OPMA notice defects; scope limited to that remedy)
- Wood v. Battle Ground Sch. Dist., 107 Wn. App. 550 (2001) (three-part test for electronic communication meetings: majority, collective intent, and action)
- West v. Seattle Port Comm’n, 194 Wn. App. 821 (2016) (Division One: plain statutory language confers standing on "any person" under RCW 42.30.120/.130)
- Torgerson v. One Lincoln Tower, LLC, 166 Wn.2d 510 (2009) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216 (1989) (summary judgment burdens: moving party initial burden, then nonmoving party must show genuine issue)