Arthur v. United States
19-CF-05
| D.C. | Jul 1, 2021Background
- Appellant Robert Arthur pleaded guilty in Maryland in 1991 to second-degree rape; SORA (D.C. Sex Offender Registration Act) was enacted in 2000, creating lifetime registration for offenses like his.
- Arthur resided and worked in D.C., first registered in 2012, but was charged for failing to comply with SORA’s verification/registration requirements from May 20, 2015 to November 9, 2016.
- SORA (and CSOSA regulations) require lifetime registrants to verify information quarterly, permit CSOSA to require in-person verification in certain circumstances, and authorize public notification (including active electronic alerts).
- Arthur moved to dismiss, arguing SORA’s retroactive application violates the Ex Post Facto Clause because its effects are punitive as applied to him (claiming job loss, denial of live-in aide housing, onerous in-person reporting, and stigma).
- The Superior Court denied the motion and convicted Arthur after a bench trial; on appeal the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on prior controlling precedent and Smith v. Doe.
Issues
| Issue | Arthur's Argument | Gov't's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SORA’s retroactive application to Arthur violates the Ex Post Facto Clause (is SORA punitive as applied?) | SORA’s effects (employment loss, housing exclusion, in-person reporting, public stigma) impose punishment when applied to him | SORA is a civil, remedial regulatory scheme; prior D.C. precedent already held it nonpunitive; Arthur’s individual hardships do not convert it to punishment | Court affirmed: SORA is civil; Arthur’s as-applied claims fail because they do not overcome precedent or show clear, broad punitive effect |
| Whether the CSOSA in-person verification requirement renders SORA punitive (facial or as-applied) | Quarterly in-person reporting is onerous and punitive, especially when enforced on lifetime registrants | In-person checks are authorized for legitimate regulatory reasons (missed/incorrect verifications, new photos, supervision) and are not inherently punitive | Denied: in-person verification is authorized, serves nonpunitive aims, and record shows Arthur’s history justified in-person contact; no "clearest proof" of punitive effect |
| Whether Arthur’s asserted employment and housing harms establish a broad punitive effect | Job termination (2013) and disqualification as live-in aide for his mother show concrete, punitive consequences of SORA | Those harms are anecdotal/idiosyncratic, undocumented, and often flow from the underlying conviction or unrelated policies (e.g., HUD rules), not SORA itself | Denied: single‑individual or undocumented harms do not satisfy the required "clearest proof" to relabel SORA punitive; no showing of widespread classburdening effect |
| Whether prior rulings (In re W.M. and Seling) preclude revisiting SORA’s civil characterization | Argues SORA’s real-world operation has changed and creates punitive effects warranting as-applied relief | Court is bound by In re W.M.; Seling bars recharacterizing a statute as punitive based on its effect on a single individual after the highest court of the jurisdiction has construed it as civil | Court held: bound by In re W.M.; Seling prohibits re-evaluating SORA’s civil nature based on Arthur’s individual circumstances; no intervening statutory changes shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (framework for assessing whether registration laws are punitive under the Ex Post Facto Clause)
- In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431 (D.C. 2004) (D.C. Court’s prior definitive holding that SORA is civil and remedial)
- Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (holding that a state court’s determination that a statute is civil forecloses an as-applied recharacterization based on individual effects)
- Does 1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) (example of a registration scheme the Sixth Circuit found punitive based on broad geographic and collateral restrictions)
- Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013) (guidance on Ex Post Facto analysis and assessing increased punishment risk)
- Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000) (requiring showing that a change creates a significant risk of increased punishment for ex post facto challenges)
- Tilley v. United States, 238 A.3d 961 (D.C. 2020) (standard for facial challenge: punishment in all applications)