Arthur Franklin Miller, Jr. v. State
05-14-01065-CR
| Tex. App. | Apr 26, 2017Background
- Arthur Franklin Miller Jr. waived his jury and received a bench trial and punishment; he later claimed his trial counsel gave incorrect advice about probation eligibility, causing the jury waiver.
- At the pretrial colloquy the judge initially stated Miller was not probation-eligible based on a mistaken offense date; the prosecutor corrected the date and said probation was possible; the judge then told Miller a jury could give probation.
- Miller moved for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) because counsel misadvised him about probation eligibility and thus caused him to waive a jury for punishment.
- The trial judge made express factual findings that both prosecutors and defense counsel believed Miller was probation-eligible and that counsel told Miller so, but the judge denied relief applying a standard that required showing a different outcome.
- A plurality of this Court evaluated prejudice by comparing the actual bench-trial outcome with the hypothetical jury outcome (requiring proof of a reasonably likely different result, specifically probation); the dissent argues that approach is legally incorrect and instead contends the waiver itself constitutes prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Miller) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s erroneous advice about probation eligibility causing a jury waiver can constitute prejudice for IAC | Miller: Waiver of a jury is itself prejudice when caused by counsel’s bad advice; no need to show a likely different substantive outcome | State: Miller must show a reasonable likelihood that a jury would have produced a different result (e.g., probation) | Dissent: Waiver = prejudice under Hill/Flores-Ortega; remand to apply waiver-focused standard |
| Proper prejudice standard when counsel’s error induces waiver of a judicial proceeding | Miller: Apply Hill/Flores-Ortega — focus on whether the defendant’s decision to waive was caused by counsel’s deficient performance | State: Apply a different-outcome test (compare bench verdict to hypothetical jury verdict) | Dissent: Hill/Flores-Ortega controls; different-outcome inquiry is ancillary and should not replace waiver analysis |
| Whether prior Texas precedent (Recer vs. Riley) requires showing a different outcome from a jury | Miller: Recer required only that defendant would have elected jury, not that outcome would differ; Riley improperly added outcome requirement | State: Relies on Riley to require showing that results would have been different | Dissent: Recer aligns with Hill; Riley’s added requirement is unsupported and should not be followed |
| Whether the trial court’s findings were sufficient or whether remand for express findings applying the correct standard is required | Miller: Trial court used wrong standard; its findings are insufficient — court should expressly decide whether counsel’s advice caused the waiver | State: Trial court’s implicit and explicit findings support denial under the different-outcome approach | Held (dissent): Remand to trial court for express findings under proper waiver/prejudice standard and then reconsider on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice from counsel advice in plea context is whether defendant would have acted differently)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (two-part IAC test: deficient performance and prejudice; focus on fairness of challenged proceeding)
- Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (waiver of an appellate right caused by counsel can constitute prejudice; proceedings that never occurred warrant no presumption of reliability)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (prejudice assessed by the loss of plea opportunity and benefits caused by counsel’s errors)
- Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (presumption of reliability in judicial proceedings)
- State v. Recer, 815 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (required proof defendant would have elected jury but did not require showing a different outcome)
- Riley v. State, 378 S.W.3d 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (treated Recer as requiring proof that results would have differed)
- Ex parte Cash, 178 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (distinguishable; involved jury trial and jury punishment)
- Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (structural-error/waiver analysis applies to jury waiver situations)
- Davis v. State, 278 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (abatement to trial court for express findings when necessary)