Arthur E. Selnick Associates, Inc. v. Howard County Maryland
51 A.3d 76
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2012Background
- Selnick filed suit in Howard County seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief over a temporary easement for Amberton Drive on Kaiser Aetna land.
- Kaiser Aetna granted a revertible, temporary easement that would terminate and revert when a permanent SHA entrance was built.
- Howard County built Amberton Drive using the temporary easement; traffic increased and Selnick alleged it affected tenants.
- SHA/County contemplated a second entrance and an option agreement (1990) affecting the termination of the temporary easement.
- Circuit Court held the easement would become permanent after 30 years under RP 6-101 and refused to consider parol evidence; dismissed claims against the County and SHA.
- Court of Appeals reversed, holding RP 6-101 does not apply to easements and the easement remains temporary until a second access road is constructed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RP 6-101 applies to easements. | Selnick: RP 6-101 applies only to fee simple interests. | Howard County/SHA: easements can be subject to 6-101 as a revertible interest. | RP 6-101 does not apply to easements. |
| Whether parol evidence was admissible to interpret the 1974 deed and 1990 Option Agreement. | Selnick: extrinsic evidence should clarify temporary vs. perpetual. | Language is clear; parol evidence would inject new terms. | Parol evidence not admissible; language clear. |
| Whether Howard County/SHA actions amounted to an unconstitutional taking. | Easement use and planned second entrance harms property value; taking implied. | Easement and license defenses negate taking; no complete deprivation. | No taking; temporary easement remains until second entrance is built. |
| Whether there is an easement by necessity over Selnick’s property. | Merritt/Merritt-Sbl claim supports necessity despite easement. | Necessity not satisfied; existence depends on contemporaneous grant. | Easement by necessity not established; Merritt’s claim rejected. |
Key Cases Cited
- Anne Arundel Cnty. v. Crofton Corp., 286 Md. 666 (1980) (contract duration and implied termini considerations)
- Shallow Run L.P. v. SHA, 113 Md.App. 156 (1996) (easement duration not vague where clearly tied to access)
- Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425 (1999) (ambiguity; extrinsic evidence when ambiguity exists)
- Drolsum v. Horne, 114 Md.App. 704 (1997) (plain meaning governs if unambiguous)
- Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 408 Md. 242 (2009) (distinction between reverter and right of entry; easements context)
- Gregg Neck Yacht Club, Inc. v. County Commissioners of Kent County, 137 Md.App. 732 (2001) (contract interpretation principles apply to deeds)