Arthur Bryant v. Richard Brown
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 20759
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Arthur John Bryant, 17, was arrested for murdering his stepmother Carol; her body was found in her car trunk with Bryant’s jeans and DNA linking him to the body.
- While in custody and after requesting counsel, Indiana statute allowed a juvenile to consult a parent; Bryant met his mother and made an incriminating statement that detectives secretly recorded.
- Two detectives testified to that recorded statement at trial; defense objected to one detective’s testimony (overruled) but not to the other’s identical testimony.
- Defense presented a theory blaming Lee (stepfather); evidence at trial included surprise testimony that Bryant threatened to kill Carol and testimony about Bryant’s prior misconduct and convictions.
- On direct appeal the Indiana Court of Appeals held the covert recording violated the statutory consultation right but deemed the error waived/harmless because the second detective’s testimony was unobjected to; postconviction and federal habeas courts reviewed ineffective-assistance and Brady claims and denied relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of surreptitious recording/statutory parental-consultation violation | Recording violated Indiana statute; statement should be excluded | Admission harmless because identical unobjected testimony was admitted and evidence of guilt was overwhelming | Court: State court reasonably found error nonprejudicial; failure to preserve objection not reversible |
| Ineffective assistance: failure to object to Whelan’s testimony and other trial decisions | Counsel’s failures (not preserving objection; not impeaching surprise witness; not objecting to parole-agent testimony; opening door to bad-acts testimony; not interviewing Beemer) were deficient and prejudicial | Counsel’s choices were strategic; even if deficient, no reasonable probability of a different outcome given evidence | Court: State court reasonably applied Strickland; decisions fell within wide range of competent strategy and no prejudice shown |
| Brady: misleading police report about Beemer’s account (attributing abuse to Bryant rather than Lee) | Misleading report suppressed favorable evidence that could have supported the Lee-defense and was material | Prosecutor disclosed report; defense could have discovered Beemer; even if suppressed, her statements would have been inadmissible hearsay and immaterial | Court: State court reasonably rejected Brady on materiality (no reasonable probability of different result) |
| Cumulative-error | Combined effect of the foregoing errors deprived Bryant of fair trial | Individual claims fail, so cumulative-effect claim fails | Court: No cumulative-error warranting relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Ineffective-assistance two-part standard)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (Prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (Deference to state-court decisions on habeas review)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (Deference under Strickland and § 2254(d))
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (Materiality standard for Brady)
- Ward v. Neal, 835 F.3d 698 (Seventh Circuit discussion of § 2254(d) review)
- Hinesley v. Knight, 837 F.3d 721 (Strickland deference and wide range of reasonable assistance)
- Jones v. Butler, 778 F.3d 575 (Impeachment decisions as strategic choices)
- Jardine v. Dittmann, 658 F.3d 772 (Definition of suppression under Brady)
- Harper v. Brown, 865 F.3d 857 (State-law evidentiary rulings not grounds for federal habeas relief)