563 S.W.3d 457
Tex. App.2018Background
- Appellant Arthur Office was indicted (Apr 24, 2013) for aggravated assault of a family member and later imprisoned on federal charges; a Harris County detainer was lodged while he served a federal sentence in Louisiana.
- Office prepared a pro se IADA-related request in April 2016 (mail stamp Apr 11, 2016) and the State completed IADA Forms VI/VII and a Prosecutor’s Certification in June–July 2016, arranging temporary custody and transfer for September 2016.
- Office was transferred to Harris County Sept 9, 2016; counsel appointed Sept 14, 2016; pretrial settings occurred through late 2016 and early 2017.
- Office filed a Demand for Trial under the IADA Sept 26, 2016, claiming the 180-day Article III(a) period began April 20, 2016 and expired Oct 17, 2016, so trial after that date required dismissal with prejudice.
- The trial court denied Office’s IADA dismissal demand; Office pleaded guilty March 31, 2017 pursuant to a plea agreement and received 6 years’ confinement; Office appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the IADA 180-day clock began running on receipt of Office's request and required dismissal because trial occurred after 180 days | Office: Form VII shows State and court received his request Apr 20, 2016, so 180 days expired before trial and dismissal is required | State: Record does not show proper delivery or statutory compliance with Article III(a); Office failed to satisfy IADA mailing/certificate requirements so 180-day period never began | Court: Denied dismissal—Office failed to comply with IADA requirements (registered/certified mailing, delivery to court, custody certificate), so 180-day period never triggered |
Key Cases Cited
- Hopper v. State, 520 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (overview of IADA duties and purpose)
- Votta v. State, 299 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (IADA statutory framework and timing rules)
- Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43 (1993) (180-day period begins only upon actual delivery of request to court and prosecutor)
- Huff v. State, 467 S.W.3d 11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015) (failure to send request by certified/registered mail prevents 180-day clock from starting)