136 S. Ct. 1409
SCOTUS2016Background
- Petition sought review of Williamson County’s rule that Takings Clause claims are not ripe in federal court until the plaintiff pursues state compensation procedures.
- The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari; Justices Thomas and Kennedy dissented from the denial.
- Justice Thomas’s dissent argues Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank (1985) is atextual and ahistorical and should be overruled.
- Thomas contends Williamson County effectively imposes a state-litigation exhaustion requirement that turns the Takings Clause into a remedial afterthought rather than a precondition on government takings.
- He criticizes San Remo Hotel v. San Francisco for compounding Williamson County by allowing state-court litigation to preclude later federal review via preclusion and full-faith-and-credit doctrines.
- Thomas notes lower-court confusion about whether Williamson County is jurisdictional or prudential and highlights gamesmanship (removal/dismissal) that can leave plaintiffs without any forum.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ripeness: Must property owners pursue state compensation procedures before federal Takings Clause review? | Williamson County’s exhaustion rule is improper; Takings Clause requires compensation as a precondition, so federal review may be available without state-litigation first. | State-litigation requirement promotes orderly compensation procedures and satisfies the Constitution so federal claims are not ripe until state remedies are pursued. | Certiorari denied by the Court; dissent (Thomas, joined by Kennedy) would grant to reconsider and overrule Williamson County. |
| Text & original meaning: Does the Takings Clause mandate pre- or contemporaneous compensation? | Text and historical practice show compensation is a condition on the exercise of eminent domain — compensation must accompany the taking. | Williamson County interprets the Clause as satisfied by a reasonable post-taking compensation scheme. | Dissent finds Williamson County atextual/ahistorical and urges overruling; Court declined to take the case. |
| Effect of San Remo Hotel: Does state-court litigation foreclose federal review via preclusion/full faith and credit? | San Remo and Williamson together often bar federal courts from relitigating federal takings claims after state-court adjudication, denying meaningful federal forum. | State courts are competent to adjudicate compensation claims; full faith and credit and preclusion principles apply after state adjudication. | Dissent criticizes San Remo for effectively preventing federal review; cert denied so no change. |
| Jurisdictional vs. prudential: Is exhaustion rule jurisdictional or waivable? | The rule should not be treated as jurisdictional; it is prudential and may be waived so plaintiffs retain federal access in some circumstances. | Some courts treat the rule as jurisdictional and require strict exhaustion; others follow the Court’s later statements calling it non-jurisdictional. | Dissent highlights lower-court split and confusion; Court denied review, leaving the split unresolved. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (establishes state-litigation ripeness rule for federal takings claims)
- San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (state-court adjudication of takings-related claims can preclude later federal relitigation under preclusion/full faith and credit)
- First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (treats inverse-condemnation remedy and recognizes compensation requirement in takings context)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (addresses takings doctrine and discusses ripeness in related context)
- Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (addresses ripeness and prudential considerations in takings litigation)
- Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (explains Williamson County’s rule is not strictly jurisdictional and discusses waiver)
- Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Railroad Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890) (historical acknowledgment that compensation must be reasonably certain before disturbance of occupancy)