Arrigo v. Link
836 F.3d 787
7th Cir.2016Background
- Marylee Arrigo, longtime bookkeeper/manager for Link Stop, took FMLA leave for a severe anxiety attack in September 2010 and was authorized to return on September 27; her employer Jay Link requested a meeting before she returned and took handwritten notes titled "10/8/10 Leave of Absence Medical Review."
- Arrigo returned to work October 11, 2010; she alleges changed duties, different treatment, new work requirements, and eventual termination on January 31, 2011 after taking two days off for medication withdrawal and a contemporaneous vacation absence.
- At trial the parties stipulated Arrigo’s condition qualified as a serious health condition under the FMLA; Arrigo sued in federal court for FMLA interference/retaliation.
- The district court excluded Link’s October 8 handwritten notes and several other categories of evidence as irrelevant to the FMLA claim; trial proceeded on the sole issue whether taking/requesting FMLA leave was a reason for termination.
- The jury found Arrigo did not prove that leave was a reason for termination. Before trial Arrigo’s motion (filed four months after the scheduling-order deadline) to amend her complaint to add Title VII and ADA claims was denied for lack of good cause; a later suit asserting those same claims was dismissed as barred.
Issues and Key Cases Cited
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of Link’s 10/8/10 handwritten notes | Notes show Link’s animus toward Arrigo’s medical condition/leave and bear on motive for termination | Notes concern medical details, not leave or hostile attitude toward use of leave; irrelevant and prejudicial | Exclusion not an abuse of discretion: notes did not tend to show anti-leave animus and could confuse issues |
| Exclusion of other testimony (vacation conversation, co-workers’ praise, arrival times, additional medical detail) | Testimony shows state of mind, contemporaneous facts, and performance evidence rebutting pretext | Relevant inquiry is what Link honestly believed at time of termination; much testimony not shown to have been communicated to Link or is cumulative | District court properly limited evidence; excluding it was within discretion because Link’s beliefs controlled and parties had stipulated to serious health condition |
| Denial of leave to amend to add Title VII and ADA claims after scheduling deadline | Delay caused by parallel state administrative proceedings and waiting for right-to-sue; amendment would efficiently consolidate claims | Motion was untimely (filed 4 months after deadline); plaintiff could have sought stay or right-to-sue earlier; allowing amendment would prejudice defendants and require new discovery | Denial affirmed: plaintiff failed to show good cause to modify the scheduling order under Rule 16(b) |
| Dismissal of second lawsuit asserting Title VII/ADA claims after denial to amend | Dismissal premature because no final judgment in first suit; res judicata not applicable | Allowing second suit undermines denial to amend and prejudices defendants; litigating both would waste resources | Dismissal affirmed: permitting second suit would nullify denial of untimely amendment and cause prejudice; res judicata/claim-splitting principles bar the second action |
Key Cases Cited
- Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663 (7th Cir.) (abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings)
- Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dep’t, 590 F.3d 427 (7th Cir.) (deference to district court evidentiary decisions)
- Whitfield v. Int’l Truck & Engine Corp., 755 F.3d 438 (7th Cir.) (remarks showing discriminatory propensity may be direct evidence)
- Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680 (7th Cir.) (focus on employer’s honest belief in pretext analysis)
- Liu v. Cook County, 817 F.3d 307 (7th Cir.) (employer’s honest belief, not correctness, is central)
- Little v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 369 F.3d 1007 (7th Cir.) (distinguishing honest belief from correctness)
- Dubicz v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 377 F.3d 787 (7th Cir.) (delay alone usually not enough to deny amendment)
- Adams v. City of Indianapolis, 742 F.3d 720 (7th Cir.) (Rule 16 good-cause requirement to modify scheduling order)
- Palka v. City of Chicago, 662 F.3d 428 (7th Cir.) (stay-first approach when parallel administrative/right-to-sue prerequisites exist)
- Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 337 (7th Cir.) (plaintiff should not split causes of action across forums)
- Johnson v. SCA Disposal Servs. of New England, 931 F.2d 970 (1st Cir.) (appeal is plaintiff’s recourse when amendment denied)
- Hyson USA, Inc. v. Hyson 2U, Ltd., 821 F.3d 935 (7th Cir.) (standard of review for dismissal de novo)