472 P.3d 927
Utah2020Background
- Worker Noe Arreguin was injured when a sleeping motorist veered off I‑15 and struck the ladder on which Arreguin was working for a Hadco subcontractor.
- Hadco was the general contractor responsible for implementing a traffic control plan; no traffic control devices (e.g., barrels) were in place at the accident site.
- Arreguin retained traffic‑control expert Bruce Reading; Hadco deposed Reading (electing deposition rather than written report) prior to trial.
- At trial Reading testified, over Hadco’s midtrial objection, that properly placed barrels would likely have been struck, would have awakened the driver, and would have changed where the accident occurred (a causation opinion that Hadco contended was undisclosed).
- The jury apportioned fault 60% to the driver and 40% to Hadco; Hadco appealed, arguing Rule 26 violations and that the district court erred in admitting undisclosed causation testimony; the court of appeals reversed for harmful error and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Arreguin) | Defendant's Argument (Hadco) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court of appeals erred in considering Reading’s deposition and expert disclosures that were filed after judgment | Materials filed after judgment should not be considered; they were not part of the trial record | The court of appeals permissibly considered extra‑record materials under the circumstances; but the sidebar alone suffices to decide the Rule 26 question | Court did not need to decide the record question; it resolved the Rule 26 issue based solely on the trial sidebar and affirmed the court of appeals’ result |
| Whether the district court erred under Utah R. Civ. P. 26 by allowing undisclosed causation testimony from Reading | Because Hadco chose deposition over report, Reading was not limited at trial; deposition election frees an expert from report‑like limits | Electing deposition requires opposing counsel to “lock in” the expert at the deposition; undisclosed causation testimony requires exclusion absent harmlessness or good cause | District court abused its discretion by overruling Hadco’s objection; an expert is not a free‑for‑all simply because a deposition was used |
| Whether Reading’s causation testimony was harmless error | Testimony was cumulative/common sense; harmless because jurors could reach same result without expert | Testimony was specific, definitive, and carried expert imprimatur; not equivalent to equivocal lay or other expert testimony | Error was harmful: Reading’s specific causation opinions were neither obvious nor merely cumulative and likely affected the jury’s apportionment |
| Whether Hadco forfeited arguments about supplementation/preservation | Hadco waived/specified arguments by not raising them in the same form on appeal | Hadco consistently argued Reading never disclosed a causation opinion and was locked to deposition testimony | Court rejected Arreguin’s forfeiture claim and addressed Hadco’s preserved arguments |
Key Cases Cited
- Arreguin-Leon v. Hadco Constr. LLC, 438 P.3d 25 (Utah Ct. App. 2018) (court of appeals reversed for admission of undisclosed expert causation testimony)
- Vander Veur v. Groove Entm’t Techs., 452 P.3d 1173 (Utah 2019) (standard of review on certiorari: review for correctness)
- H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 203 P.3d 943 (Utah 2009) (harmless error defined as an error unlikely to have affected the outcome)