Arredondo v. Elwood Staffing Svc, 81 F.4th 419

Background

Elwood Staffing placed Frances Arredondo and Sage Coleman at Schlumberger’s Permian Basin “gun shop.” A senior employee, Brenda Mitre, engaged in repeated sexual harassment of both women and ultimately raped Arredondo; Mitre also directed racial epithets and disparate treatment at Black employees.
Coleman complained to Schlumberger’s HR and to Elwood; Schlumberger’s investigator concluded Coleman’s complaints were unverified and terminated Coleman; Mitre received a written warning.
Arredondo reported assaults to Schlumberger and to Elwood only after she resigned; Schlumberger later investigated and terminated Mitre for job abandonment.
Plaintiffs sued Schlumberger and Elwood under Title VII for hostile work environment (sex and race), quid pro quo sexual harassment, disparate treatment, and retaliation. The district court let several claims against Schlumberger proceed but granted summary judgment for Elwood on all claims; Schlumberger thereafter settled.
On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Elwood, arguing Elwood knew or should have known of Schlumberger’s misconduct and failed to take corrective action (or independently retaliated or otherwise is liable).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Whether Elwood retaliated against Coleman by failing to place her in comparable work after she reported harassment (direct retaliation)	Coleman: submitting an incident report to Elwood was protected activity; Elwood’s failure to reassign her was an adverse action	Elwood: it did not take any materially adverse employment action; it offered application options and could not force placements	Held: No. Coleman failed to show an adverse employment action; summary judgment for Elwood affirmed
2) Whether Elwood is liable under Burton (knew-or-should-have-known) for Coleman’s alleged retaliation by a client	Coleman: Elwood knew of Schlumberger’s suspicious firing and failed to take corrective action within its control	Elwood: it investigated, questioned Schlumberger, and offered Coleman the chance to apply for other jobs; no further action was possible	Held: No. Elwood satisfied what was reasonably within its control; Burton liability not established
3) Whether Mitre was Coleman’s “supervisor” (quid pro quo sexual-harassment) so Schlumberger/Elwood are liable	Coleman: Mitre functioned as a supervisor and caused the tangible employment action (termination)	Elwood: Mitre lacked the power to take tangible employment actions; investigator Mendha made termination decision	Held: No. Mitre was not a supervisor as defined in Vance; summary judgment for Elwood affirmed
4) Whether Elwood is liable for hostile work environment (Coleman—race; Arredondo—sex) and for Arredondo’s constructive discharge	Plaintiffs: conditions were severe/pervasive and Elwood knew or should have known (via Coleman’s complaint or constructive notice) and failed to act	Elwood: lacked actual or constructive knowledge until after the adverse actions; it took reasonable steps once notified	Held: No. Plaintiffs failed to show Elwood had actual or constructive notice or could have taken further remedial measures; summary judgment for Elwood affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2015) (staffing-agency liability where agency knew or should have known of client discrimination and failed to act)
Nicholson v. Securitas Sec. Servs. USA, Inc., 830 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 2016) (clarifying Burton: requires actual and constructive knowledge plus failure to act)
McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing when staffing agencies make ‘ultimate employment decisions’)
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013) (defining “supervisor” for quid pro quo harassment—must have power to take tangible employment actions)
Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (standard for severe or pervasive hostile-work-environment)
Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2012) (when complaining would be a futile act and thus need not be attempted)
Aryain v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex. LP, 534 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2008) (definition of materially adverse action in retaliation context)
Casiano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2000) (tangible employment-action examples for quid pro quo analysis)
Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8 F.4th 393 (5th Cir. 2021) (forfeiture and briefing requirements)
Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7 F.4th 392 (5th Cir. 2021) (example of severe/pervasive racial harassment for hostile-work-environment analysis)