932 F.3d 822
9th Cir.2019Background
- Guam’s 2000 Plebiscite Law limited voting in a political-status plebiscite to “Native Inhabitants of Guam,” defined by reference to persons who became U.S. citizens under the 1950 Organic Act and their descendants.
- Prior Guam laws (the 1996 Registry Act, the 1997 Plebiscite Law, and Chamorro Land Trust Commission rules) used the term “Chamorro” with materially similar ancestry-based definitions.
- Davis, a non-Chamorro resident, was denied registration for the Guam Decolonization Registry and sued, challenging the law under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Voting Rights Act, and the Organic Act.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Davis, enjoining Guam from holding the race-limited plebiscite; Guam appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit considered whether the plebiscite is an election covered by the Fifteenth Amendment and whether the ancestry-based voter restriction functions as a racial classification (a proxy for race) in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Fifteenth Amendment apply to the plebiscite? | Davis: yes — the plebiscite decides a public issue and binds a government body, so it is an election covered by the Amendment. | Guam: no — the plebiscite is advisory and does not itself change political status, so it is not an election deciding a public issue. | Held: The Amendment applies — the plebiscite commits a governmental commission to transmit and advocate a public position, so it decides a public governmental issue. |
| Does the voter-eligibility definition (“Native Inhabitants of Guam”) discriminate "on account of race"? | Davis: the definition mirrors prior Chamorro-based laws and functions as an ancestry-based proxy for race, violating the Fifteenth Amendment. | Guam: the classification is political/colonial (tied to citizenship under the Organic Act), not racial; ancestry alone is not always a racial classification. | Held: The definition is a proxy for the racial classification “Chamorro” (given near-identical definitions, legislative history, and timing after Rice) and thus violates the Fifteenth Amendment. |
| Is ancestry-based classification categorically impermissible as a proxy for race? | Davis: ancestral criteria here operate as a racial proxy and should be invalidated. | Guam: ancestry is not always equivalent to race; some ancestry classifications (e.g., Indian-tribal Mancari context) are political and permissible. | Held: Ancestry is not always a proxy for race, but it can be; here the historical context and continuity with expressly racial enactments make the ancestry test a racial proxy. |
| Remedy / scope: What is the appropriate outcome and scope of decision? | Davis: injunction against using the law to limit plebiscite voting. | Guam: urged deference or narrower ruling. | Held: Affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction prohibiting Guam from conducting the plebiscite limited to “Native Inhabitants of Guam” on Fifteenth Amendment grounds; the court did not decide other claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (invalidating ancestry-based Hawaiian voting restriction as a racial proxy)
- Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm’n, 844 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2016) (ancestry-based CNMI voting restriction is a racial proxy)
- Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (Fifteenth Amendment covers elections that decide public governmental issues)
- Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (facially neutral, historically tethered voting qualifications can revive race-based restrictions)
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (Fifteenth Amendment forbids sophisticated as well as simple racial modes of discrimination)
- Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (ancestry-based preferences for federally recognized Indians are political, not racial, in a distinct context)