785 F.3d 1311
9th Cir.2015Background
- Guam law creates a Political Status Plebiscite contingent on 70% of eligible Native Inhabitants registering.
- Eligible voters can register via the Decolonization Registry; Native Inhabitants are defined by Guam law, not all residents.
- Davis, a Guam resident, is not a Native Inhabitant and was denied registration; he sues alleging the Native Inhabitant classification is a race proxy.
- The plebiscite would measure Native Inhabitants' views on Independence, Free Association, or Statehood and its results would be transmitted to the President, Congress, and the United Nations.
- The 70% registration threshold currently is not close to being met, so the plebiscite date has not been set.
- The district court dismissed for lack of standing and ripeness; the Ninth Circuit reversed in part on standing and ripeness for Davis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Davis has Article III standing to challenge the classification. | Davis has a cognizable injury from being denied registration and the right to influence the plebiscite. | Guam’s classification does not injure Davis because the plebiscite may never occur and is not self-executing. | Davis has standing. |
| Whether the claim is ripe given the plebiscite is contingent on registration and not currently scheduled. | Ripeness exists because he is currently denied equal treatment in the ongoing process. | Ripeness requires a concrete, imminent injury; the plebiscite is speculative and not imminent. | The claim is ripe. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete, particularized injury; injury must be traceable and redressable)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (general standing principles; favor plaintiff-centric interpretation of allegations)
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (standing analysis and injury-in-fact requirements)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (equal protection; jury-selection context cited for unequal treatment principle)
- Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cnty., 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (race-based jury exclusion; equal protection principles relevant to registration rights)
- Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (standing to challenge unequal treatment even if direct benefit is not guaranteed)