Arnold Chew v. City & County of San Francisco
714 F. App'x 687
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Arnold Chew worked at Laguna Honda Hospital (LHH) since 1998 and alleged associational race discrimination and retaliation based on his relationship with co-worker Leonard Collins (African‑American).
- Chew filed DFEH/EEOC charges in 2013 that identified age and disability (and earlier an unspecified "Other" charge withdrawn), but never alleged race or associational discrimination in those formal charges.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the City and LHH; Chew appealed the merits ruling, evidentiary rulings, and costs award of $4,399.59.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed exhaustion of administrative remedies and applied McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting for Title VII, § 1981, and FEHA claims, affirming the grant of summary judgment.
- The court held Chew failed to exhaust his EEOC/DFEH remedies for associational race claims and, alternatively, failed to raise a triable issue of pretext because of a long history of documented performance problems predating Collins.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chew exhausted administrative remedies for associational race discrimination/retaliation | Chew contends his administrative filings (and later counsel letter) reasonably relate to his associational race claims | Defendants contend the DFEH/EEOC charges identified other bases (age, disability) and did not put agencies on notice of race/associational claims | Held: No exhaustion — associational race claims were not reasonably related to the administrative charges; thus barred. |
| Whether Chew established prima facie discrimination/retaliation under McDonnell Douglas | Chew argues he showed qualification, association with Collins, adverse actions (reviews, suspensions, development plan) | Defendants argue adverse actions were based on longstanding, non‑discriminatory performance issues | Held: Chew met minimal prima facie showing, but that does not resolve pretext. |
| Whether defendants articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons and whether Chew showed pretext | Chew argues discipline and scrutiny began after associating with Collins, implying pretext | Defendants point to documented performance problems and suspensions dating years before Collins’s arrival and the challenged actions | Held: Defendants articulated nondiscriminatory reasons; Chew failed to provide specific and substantial evidence of pretext (no direct discriminatory statements; prior adverse reviews undermine inference of discrimination). |
| Whether City is liable under Monell for municipal policy/custom | Chew argues municipal responsibility for discriminatory practice | Defendants deny any policy, custom, or final‑policymaker decision causing discrimination | Held: No Monell liability — no evidence of policy, long‑standing practice, or final policymaker decision. |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for employment discrimination)
- Green v. Los Angeles Cty. Superintendent of Schs., 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1989) (administrative charge scope limits subsequent civil action; claims must be like or reasonably related)
- Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpret administrative charge liberally but not enough to merely mention "discrimination")
- Dominguez‑Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff must show employer’s nondiscriminatory reason is pretext)
- Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 1998) (definition of direct evidence of discriminatory animus)
- EEOC v. Boeing Co., 577 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (requires "specific and substantial" indirect evidence of pretext)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability only for official policy, custom, or final policymaker act)