Armstrong v. The City of San Jose
5:16-cv-02938
| N.D. Cal. | Jan 17, 2017Background
- Plaintiff David Armstrong operates MediMarts, a San Jose medical cannabis collective and refused to pay a city cannabis sales tax; he litigated against the City over the tax and alleged the mayor expressed animus toward him.
- In 2015–2016, San Jose police twice surveilled and stopped Armstrong after neighbors reported reckless driving; the first stop resulted in a citation, the second (March 3, 2016) led to a forceful arrest.
- Armstrong alleges an officer shoved him into a vehicle with enough force to dent the panel, causing shoulder, arm, and knee injuries requiring medical treatment.
- Armstrong claims selective enforcement of vehicle-code § 23103(a) (Equal Protection), excessive force (Fourth Amendment), and retaliation for his speech and litigation (First Amendment).
- He alleges selective targeting: out of >3,000 reckless-driving reports in early 2016, only his led to arrest/citation; police previously declined to act on other reports until Armstrong was identified.
- The City moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6); the court denied the motion in all respects discussed below.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Selective enforcement / Equal Protection | Armstrong: City singled him out for enforcement as retaliation for tax dispute and litigation; similarly situated reckless drivers were not prosecuted | City: Armstrong fails to identify similarly situated comparators or plead discriminatory purpose | Denied dismissal — allegations plausibly show discriminatory effect and purpose (similarly situated other drivers not prosecuted; animus from city officials) |
| Excessive force (Fourth Amendment) | Armstrong: Officer pushed him hard enough to dent a vehicle and caused injury; force was unreasonable | City: The contact was a "mere push" and not constitutionally excessive | Denied dismissal — factual allegations of injurious, forceful shove state an excessive-force claim |
| Qualified immunity | Armstrong: Right against excessive force was clearly established; factual allegations suffice to defeat immunity at pleading stage | City: Officer entitled to qualified immunity | Denied dismissal — allegations, accepted as true, show a constitutional violation of a clearly established right |
| First Amendment retaliation | Armstrong: Arrest was intended to chill his speech and petitions; arrest had chilling effect and was the but-for cause | City: Arrest justified by traffic enforcement; no unlawful motive alleged | Denied dismissal — pleaded facts show chilling effect and sufficient allegations that retaliation was a but-for cause |
| Punitive damages | Armstrong: Facts show intentional or reckless conduct supporting punitive damages | City: No showing of intentional or reckless violation warrants punitive damages | Denied dismissal — allegations of animus and targeted sting operations suffice at pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) (Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Rosenbaum v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007) (selective enforcement requires discriminatory effect and purpose)
- Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (discriminatory purpose element for selective prosecution)
- Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (examples of enforcement conduct showing selective enforcement)
- United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (must show similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted)
- Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection claim)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective reasonableness standard for use of force)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (qualified immunity two-step: constitutional violation and clearly established law)
- Grant v. City of Long Beach, 315 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2002) (qualified immunity analysis at pleading stage)
- Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2013) (elements for First Amendment retaliation claims)
- Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2006) (retaliation claim can survive even if probable cause existed)
- Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (standard for punitive damages under § 1983)