Armstrong v. Daily
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7761
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Ralph Armstrong was convicted in 1981 for the rape and murder of Charise Kamps and served 29 years before his conviction was vacated and charges later dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct.
- Early investigation: prosecutor John Norsetter directed the investigation; key physical items (bathrobe belt with semen stain and drug paraphernalia) were found but not properly preserved or tested; alleged suggestive hypnosis and show-ups were used to secure identification.
- Drug paraphernalia allegedly was placed in a trash bag, stored, and lost before trial; Armstrong claims it would have had exculpatory value (fingerprints/DNA).
- After the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered a new trial in 2005, lab techs Karen Daily and Daniel Campbell performed a Y‑STR test in 2006 that consumed the only remaining semen sample on the bathrobe belt, producing inconclusive results that could not distinguish Armstrong from his brother.
- State court later found the destruction of the belt sample was done in bad faith and dismissed the charges; Armstrong then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging due‑process violations from deliberate destruction of exculpatory evidence.
- On appeal from denial of qualified immunity, the Seventh Circuit allowed claims against Norsetter (for loss/destruction of drug paraphernalia in his investigatory capacity) and against Daily and Campbell (for destruction of the belt semen sample) to proceed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deliberate loss/destruction of exculpatory evidence states a due‑process violation not barred by Parratt/Hudson | Armstrong: Bad‑faith destruction of evidence that corrupts a criminal fact‑finding process violates fundamental fairness and is actionable under § 1983 | Defendants: Parratt/Hudson mean state tort remedies suffice for random unauthorized deprivations, so no federal due‑process claim | Court: Parratt/Hudson do not apply to corrupting conduct that undermines trial fairness; federal due‑process claim allowed |
| Whether Norsetter’s 1980 conduct (loss of drug paraphernalia) violated a clearly established right | Armstrong: Killian and Brady established prosecutors cannot in bad faith destroy potentially exculpatory evidence | Norsetter: No clearly established duty in 1980; evidence only potentially exculpatory; qualified immunity applies | Court: Killian and Brady put reasonable officials on notice; pleadings plausibly allege bad faith; qualified immunity denied at pleading stage |
| Whether Daily and Campbell’s 2006 testing that consumed the last semen sample violated due process absent a retrial/conviction | Armstrong: Bad‑faith destruction (or destruction of evidence with apparent exculpatory value) caused further imprisonment and violated due process even without a later retrial | Defendants: A retrial/conviction is necessary for a constitutional injury; also argue right wasn’t clearly established in 2006 | Court: Destruction in bad faith or of apparent exculpatory value is a constitutional violation; causation to additional imprisonment alleged; qualified immunity denied |
| Whether law in 2006 clearly established that destroying exculpatory evidence is unlawful (qualified immunity second prong) | Armstrong: Youngblood/Trombetta (and earlier precedent) made bad‑faith destruction unlawful well before 2006 | Defendants: Circuit uncertainty about when a § 1983 remedy is available before conviction means the law wasn’t clearly established | Court: Focus is on unlawfulness of the conduct itself; Youngblood/Trombetta/Killian/Brady provided fair warning; qualified immunity denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (procedural‑due‑process rule for random, unauthorized post‑deprivation losses)
- Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (extension of Parratt to intentional property deprivations in prisons)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecution must disclose material exculpatory evidence)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (bad‑faith destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence violates due process)
- California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (due process limits on failure to preserve evidence with apparent exculpatory value)
- Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 (government destruction of possibly helpful evidence implicates due process)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (qualified immunity is an appealable collateral order)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified‑immunity two‑step inquiry)
- Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (prosecutorial fabrication/ investigative misconduct not entitled to absolute immunity)
- Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747 (§ 1983 claim for withholding/destroying exculpatory evidence may proceed despite Parratt)