Armstrong v. Ashley
60 F.4th 262
5th Cir.2023Background
- Glenn Ford was convicted in 1983 for the murder of Isadore Rozeman; new evidence identifying another shooter led Louisiana to vacate his conviction and Ford’s release in 2014.
- Ford filed a § 1983 suit alleging police and prosecutors suppressed, fabricated, and destroyed evidence; Ford died and Andrea Armstrong (executrix) continued the suit.
- Defendants included eight Shreveport police officers, the coroner’s estate (McCormick), the City of Shreveport, and Caddo Parish DA James Stewart (as the official defendant for Monell purposes).
- The district court dismissed Armstrong’s amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c) for failure to plead plausible constitutional or state-law claims and for immunity; Armstrong appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed: pleadings were conclusory, engaged in improper group pleading, failed to allege individual causation or bad faith/malice, Monell claims lacked a pleaded policy/pattern, and testimony-based claims were barred by absolute witness immunity; the recent Supreme Court decision in Thompson v. Clark recognizing a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim did not change the outcome because the state-law malicious prosecution claim also failed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Armstrong) | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of Brady/suppression claims against individual officers | Officers knowingly suppressed multiple exculpatory police reports that would have impeached the State’s case | Pleadings are conclusory, do not identify which officer suppressed which report, and are equally consistent with prosecutorial Brady violations | Dismissed: allegations were formulaic/group pleading and failed Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards |
| Fabrication and destruction of evidence (including fingerprints) | Specific officers fabricated witness statements and fingerprint evidence and destroyed/preserved evidence to hide fabrication | Allegations lack factual detail on what was fabricated, by whom, and lack facts showing bad faith; some allegations (trial testimony) barred by absolute immunity | Dismissed: fabrication/destruction claims insufficiently pled; testimony-based claims barred by absolute immunity |
| Monell liability against City of Shreveport and Caddo Parish DA | City/DA maintained customs/policies of withholding exculpatory evidence, bad training/supervision, and a pattern of Brady violations | Allegations are conclusory; no specific policymaker, no well-pled pattern or notice; cited prior cases do not show Brady violations or a pattern | Dismissed: Monell claims not plausibly pled (no official policy, no municipal custom or deliberate indifference) |
| Malicious prosecution under § 1983 after Thompson v. Clark | Armstrong sought constitutional malicious prosecution damages for Ford’s prosecution and conviction | Even accepting Thompson, Armstrong failed to plead causation and malice; state-law malicious prosecution (same elements) also fails | Dismissed: claim fails for lack of causation and malice; Thompson did not salvage the complaint |
| Immunity (qualified and absolute) | Immunity inapplicable because defendants acted maliciously and in bad faith | Qualified immunity protects officers where no clearly established right was plausibly pled; witnesses are absolutely immune for testimony | Dismissed: qualified immunity applicable given inadequate pleadings; absolute witness immunity barred testimony-based claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332 (2022) (recognizes Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim under § 1983 and requires seizure/favorable termination elements)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires an official policy or a well-settled custom with attributable knowledge)
- Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) (Fifth Circuit precedent on malicious prosecution elements, later addressed in light of Thompson)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard; conclusory allegations insufficient)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must plead factual matter that plausibly suggests liability)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence violates due process)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (failure to preserve potentially useful evidence is not a due-process violation absent bad faith)
- Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (witnesses are absolutely immune from § 1983 suits for their testimony)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (municipal liability for Brady violations requires a pattern sufficient to put policymakers on notice)
- Burge v. St. Tammany Parish, 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1999) (examples of sufficiently specific Brady/fabrication allegations against particular officers)