Armstead v. State
195 Md. App. 599
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2010Background
- Armstead was convicted of second degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder after a jury acquitted on first degree murder and handgun offenses.
- He received thirty years for second degree murder and a consecutive life sentence for conspiracy to commit murder.
- Key trial issues included whether PSI should have been ordered, whether conspiracy to murder required first-degree intent, and whether certain evidence and witness testimony were admissible or provable.
- Witness Leroy Simon testified about involvement and outside orders, while Fulton testified in defense and previously had a plea agreement with the State in a related case.
- The State sought to present competing theories across trials; the defense challenged due process and evidentiary rulings, including admission of a plea agreement and threats to a witness.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the PSI denial an abuse of discretion and harmless? | Armstead; court failed to exercise discretion by denying PSI. | State; error, if any, was harmless beyond doubt. | Harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; no reversal necessary. |
| Can conspiracy to murder be found without a first-degree conspiracy predicate? | Armstead; jury instructions were flawed, permitting unrecognized conspiracy scope. | State; Alston controls; no error given no conspiracy to second-degree murder exists. | No error; Maryland law prohibits conspiracy to murder second degree. |
| Was excluding Fulton’s plea agreement admissible and did it violate due process? | Armstead; plea evidence could impeach or adoptive admission impact credibility. | State; no due process violation; probative value limited and potential prejudice. | Exclusion not reversible error; any error deemed harmless. |
| Was admitting that Simon was threatened properly decided and curative instruction sufficient? | Armstead; threats to witness admissible to explain inconsistencies. | State; admission warranted to explain fear and inconsistency. | Court did not abuse discretion; curative instruction appropriate and admissible for credibility. |
| Was there sufficient evidence of an agreement to convict Armstead of conspiracy to murder? | Armstead; evidence showed no meeting of minds or unlawful agreement. | State; circumstantial evidence supports an unlawful conspiracy. | Sufficiency established; rational jury could infer conspiracy. |
Key Cases Cited
- Alston v. State, 414 Md. 92, 994 A.2d 896 (Md. 2010) (No conspiracy to commit second-degree murder; plain error review under preserved defense standard)
- Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 767 A.2d 844 (Md. 2001) (Conspiracy to murder requires first-degree murder intent; no conspiracy to second-degree murder)
- Thornton v. State, 397 Md. 704, 919 A.2d 678 (Md. 2007) (Distinguishes intent to inflict grievous bodily harm from intent to kill in murder variants)
- Fisher v. State, 367 Md. 218, 786 A.2d 706 (Md. 2001) (Specific intent distinctions in murder classifications)
- Bellamy v. State, 403 Md. 308, 941 A.2d 1107 (Md. 2008) (Admissibility of plea agreements as adopted admissions and related harmless error analysis)
- Washington v. State, 293 Md. 465, 445 A.2d 684 (Md. 1982) (Witness threats admissible to explain credibility; general admissibility of intimidation evidence)
- Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77, 857 A.2d 65 (Md. 2004) (Due process concerns with conflicting theories across trials; core facts must remain consistent)