763 F.3d 1122
9th Cir.2014Background
- Arris Arrendondo, pro se at trial, was convicted in Nevada of possession of a stolen vehicle and possession of stolen property and later sentenced as a habitual criminal to concurrent life terms with parole eligibility after 10 years.
- He repeatedly complained about public defenders and moved to dismiss counsel and to proceed pro se; the trial court conducted a Faretta-style colloquy and accepted his waiver after warning him of risks and telling him the penalties for the charged offenses (but before the State filed habitual-offender notice).
- At trial several listed alibi witnesses failed to appear; Arrendondo claimed he lacked time to secure subpoenas and that the court denied him compulsory process.
- On direct appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the validity of his Faretta waiver (noting the trial warnings) and rejected the claim that he lacked time to produce witnesses.
- Arrendondo filed federal habeas petitions asserting (1) invalid waiver of counsel because he was not informed he could face habitual-offender sentencing and (2) denial of compulsory process. The district court denied the waiver claim on the merits and dismissed the compulsory-process claim as unexhausted; this Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of waiver of counsel (Faretta) | Waiver was not knowing/intelligent because court did not inform him he could face life under habitual-offender enhancement | Trial court sufficiently warned of dangers of self-representation and told him the penalties for the charged offenses; enhancement had not been filed yet | Affirmed: waiver valid under AEDPA; no clearly established Supreme Court rule requires advising of uncharged sentencing enhancements |
| Voluntariness of waiver (choice vs. inadequate counsel) | Waiver involuntary because choice was between incompetent counsel and self-representation | Counsel was not shown to be constitutionally inadequate; record lacks proof of actual conflict or Strickland prejudice | Affirmed: petitioner failed to show counsel was constitutionally inadequate, so waiver not involuntary |
| Compulsory process — exhaustion | Trial court denied adequate time to produce witnesses; federal claim was presented to state court | Nevada argued petitioner presented only state-law argument and did not fairly present federal constitutional claim | Affirmed dismissal: claim unexhausted because appellant’s state briefs relied on state law and did not fairly present federal theory |
| Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as excuse for exhaustion default | Appellate counsel’s omission excused failure to exhaust compulsory-process federal claim | Petitioner did not first exhaust an IAC claim in state post-conviction proceedings; remedy available but not pursued | Affirmed: petitioner failed to exhaust available state remedies (post-conviction) to raise appellate IAC or compulsory-process claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has right to self-representation but waiver must be knowing and intelligent)
- Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (no specific script required; defendant must understand nature of charges and range of allowable punishments for a valid waiver)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference standard for state-court adjudications)
- Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (recidivist sentencing based on prior convictions may be treated differently than elements that must be charged)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (discusses requirement that facts increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be found by jury, relevant to sentencing-enhancement analysis)
- Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (actual conflict of interest requires reversal if it adversely affected counsel’s performance)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default rules and cause-and-prejudice standard to excuse default)