Armida Rivera v. Vishay Americas, Inc.
5:20-cv-01719
C.D. Cal.Oct 12, 2021Background
- Plaintiff Armida Rivera was a laser operator at Vishay Sprague, Inc. (on-site position) since 1993; she took intermittent and then continuous medical leave in 2018 for stress/anxiety while caring for her mother.
- Rivera provided successive doctors’ notes beginning May 25, 2018 (extended through Jan. 28, 2019); Vishay granted leave but had a policy terminating employment after 26 continuous weeks of disability leave.
- Vishay began discussions before the 26-week mark and terminated Rivera on Nov. 26, 2018 (26 weeks after leave began); Rivera later received a note clearing her to return May 28, 2019.
- Rivera sued under FEHA and related California law alleging disability discrimination, retaliation (FEHA and CFRA), failure to accommodate, failure to engage in the interactive process, failure to prevent, wrongful termination, declaratory relief, and punitive damages.
- The Court granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part: key denials were for discrimination, failure to prevent, failure to accommodate, and wrongful termination; grants included FEHA retaliation, CFRA retaliation, failure to engage, declaratory relief, and punitive damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reasonable accommodation (FEHA §12940(m)) | Rivera argues additional finite leave beyond 6 months was a reasonable accommodation and Vishay failed to grant it. | Vishay contends six months of leave exhausted reasonable accommodation and termination followed company policy. | DENIED for Vishay — triable dispute whether additional leave was reasonable; summary judgment inappropriate. |
| Disability discrimination (FEHA §12940(a)) | Rivera asserts termination was because of her disability/medical leave and she could be a qualified individual with more leave. | Vishay asserts termination was lawful under policy after 26 weeks and not discriminatory. | DENIED for Vishay — genuine issue whether termination was because of disability without adequate accommodation. |
| FEHA retaliation (§12940(h)) | Rivera says seeking/obtaining leave was protected activity and termination was retaliatory. | Vishay points to neutral policy-based termination after 26 weeks as legitimate nonretaliatory reason. | GRANTED for Vishay — temporal evidence is a scintilla; Vishay met its burden and Rivera failed to show pretext. |
| Failure to prevent discrimination/retaliation (§12940(k)) | Rivera contends employer failed to take steps to prevent unlawful acts. | Vishay offers no showing that prevention claim is distinct from discrimination triable issues. | DENIED for Vishay — tied to triable discrimination issues; remains for jury. |
| CFRA retaliation (§12945.2) | Rivera alleges retaliation for exercising CFRA rights. | Vishay notes it had fewer than 50 employees (pre-2021 CFRA threshold) and so CFRA does not apply; also defends termination under leave policy. | GRANTED for Vishay — Rivera ineligible for CFRA leave and claim fails. |
| Failure to engage in interactive process (§12940(n)) | Rivera alleges Vishay did not meaningfully engage to identify accommodations. | Vishay argues it engaged by accepting doctors’ notes and that Rivera did not provide specific medical limitations to continue the process. | GRANTED for Vishay — Rivera failed to show she provided medical detail necessary to continue interactive process. |
| Wrongful termination in violation of public policy (Tameny) | Rivera relies on underlying FEHA violations to support tort claim. | Vishay contends termination followed neutral policy and no statutory violation. | DENIED for Vishay — because FEHA discrimination/failure-to-accommodate claims are triable, Tameny claim survives. |
| Declaratory judgment (Cal. CCP §1060) | Rivera seeks declaration of rights. | Vishay argues declaratory relief is duplicative of substantive claims. | GRANTED for Vishay — claim is superfluous because other remedies suffice. |
| Punitive damages | Rivera seeks punitive relief based on termination and policy. | Vishay argues no evidence of malice/oppression by managing agents or ratification. | GRANTED for Vishay — no clear and convincing evidence of oppression or malice; policy/termination insufficient. |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard and view of evidence)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (movant’s burden on summary judgment)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation)
- Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank, 85 Cal. App. 4th 245 (elements of FEHA failure-to-accommodate/discrimination claims)
- Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 74 Cal. App. 4th 215 (finite leave can be reasonable accommodation)
- Sanchez v. Swissport, Inc., 213 Cal. App. 4th 1331 (finite leave beyond statutory cap may be reasonable under FEHA)
- Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235 (limits on leave as reasonable accommodation context)
- Wallace v. County of Stanislaus, 245 Cal. App. 4th 109 (causal nexus where disability is employer’s stated reason)
- Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167 (wrongful termination in violation of public policy)