Armando Mena v. David Long
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 2663
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Armando Mena pleaded guilty to multiple sexual-offense counts and received a 40-year sentence; he later pursued direct appeal and state habeas claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
- California Supreme Court denied Mena’s state habeas in a one‑sentence Duvall/Swain denial for lack of factual particularity.
- Mena filed a timely federal §2254 petition; the district court dismissed the initial petition without prejudice, then Mena filed an amended petition raising only unexhausted claims and requested a Rhines stay to return to state court.
- The magistrate judge and district court denied the stay as unavailable for fully unexhausted petitions, treating Rhines as limited to mixed petitions, and dismissed the petition.
- The Ninth Circuit granted a COA to decide whether district courts may use Rhines stay-and-abeyance for petitions containing only unexhausted claims.
- The Ninth Circuit held that district courts have discretion to stay fully unexhausted petitions under the Rhines standards and reversed and remanded for the district court to consider a stay on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Mena's Argument | Long (State)'s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district courts may stay a habeas petition that contains only unexhausted claims | Rhines stay-and-abeyance should be available for fully unexhausted petitions to avoid AEDPA‑era statute‑of‑limitations forfeitures | Rhines applies only to mixed petitions; Rose v. Lundy requires dismissal of fully unexhausted petitions | A district court may stay fully unexhausted petitions under the Rhines framework (good cause, potentially meritorious, not intentionally dilatory) |
| Whether Lundy’s pre‑AEDPA dismissal rule forecloses Rhines stays for fully unexhausted petitions | Lundy does not foreclose stays because AEDPA’s limitations made Rhines necessary and applicable to unmixed petitions | Lundy’s dismissal rule should continue to govern unmixed petitions | Lundy does not control post‑AEDPA stays; Rhines rationale applies given AEDPA’s limitations period |
| Whether Pace and other Supreme Court decisions support stays for fully unexhausted petitions | Pace and related statements suggest filing a protective federal petition and requesting a stay is appropriate even for unmixed petitions | State argues Pace’s statements were not intended for fully unexhausted petitions | Court finds Pace’s language and context support Rhines stays for fully unexhausted petitions |
| Whether Ninth Circuit precedent (Rasberry) bars a stay for fully unexhausted petitions | Mena: Rasberry did not decide this issue and only addressed a notice/leave-to-amend requirement in its factual context | State: Rasberry implies Rhines limited to mixed petitions | Court: Rasberry is not controlling; its language was context‑bound and not a circuit rule against Rhines stays for unmixed petitions |
Key Cases Cited
- Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) (authorizes stay-and-abeyance for mixed petitions under specified conditions)
- Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (pre-AEDPA rule requiring dismissal of mixed petitions containing unexhausted claims)
- Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (discusses protective federal filings and staying federal habeas while exhausting state remedies)
- Gonzalez v. Thaler, 568 U.S. 12 (2013) (notes stay-and-abeyance may be appropriate where federal filing period is truncated and claims remain unexhausted)
- Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (addressed notice/amendment issue in context of an unmixed petition; did not resolve whether Rhines applies to fully unexhausted petitions)
- Doe v. Jones, 762 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2014) (held Rhines applies to fully unexhausted petitions)
- Heleva v. Brooks, 581 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (applied Rhines to fully unexhausted petition)
- Dolis v. Chambers, 454 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2006) (applied Rhines to fully unexhausted petition)