Arkay, LLC v. City of Charleston, 791 S.E.2d 305

Background

Arkay, LLC (owned by Knoth) purchased 45 Pinckney St. to operate Carolina Polo carriage-horse business and applied for a special use exception to run a stable in a GB (general business) zone.
City zoning §54-206(p) permits stables by special exception if seven criteria are met, including that the stable not be located within 100 feet of any residential zone.
45 Pinckney St. is a single building on a lot within 100 feet of a residential district; Arkay proposed an HPR to create Unit A (stalls in rear) and Unit B (front offices/areas) plus covenants and an easement, so stalls would be >100 feet from residences.
The Board of Zoning Appeals denied Arkay’s application (and a variance), concluding the building as a whole was within 100 feet and the HPR did not alter that.
The circuit court reversed, holding the ordinance’s separation requirement applies to the use of “stabling” (where horses are kept) not the physical structure, and relied in part on Arkay’s proposed HPR; the City appealed.
The appellate majority reversed the circuit court, holding the 100-foot rule applies to the physical structure (the building as a stable) and the HPR did not change that result.

Issues

Issue	Arkay's Argument	City/Appellants' Argument	Held
Whether §54-206(p)(1)’s 100-foot separation applies to the "use" (where horses are kept) or to the physical building	The separation restricts the stabling activity (where animals are kept); defining stable as where horses are kept allows HPR to satisfy distance	The ordinance contemplates the building as the stable; separation measures to the structure on the lot	Held: 100-foot requirement applies to the physical structure operating as a stable (building), not merely the internal stalls or use location.
Whether tourism-code definitions (e.g., stable = "barn where animals are kept") may be used to interpret the zoning code	Arkay: tourism definitions shouldn’t govern zoning; context limits their scope	City: tourism definitions regulate carriage businesses and are in pari materia with zoning provisions	Held: Court relied on tourism ordinance definitions as complementary and used them to show "stable" means the barn/building.
Whether Arkay’s proposed Horizontal Property Regime (HPR) can satisfy separation	Arkay: HPR dividing units (with covenant barring stalls in Unit B) effectively locates stables >100 ft from residences	City: HPR does not subdivide the building or change that the single building is within 100 ft	Held: HPR does not alter the building’s status; it does not satisfy the separation requirement.
Proper measurement point for the 100-foot separation (easement/access vs. structure)	Arkay: separation should be measured to the stabling/use (stalls) not to the access easement or other parts used for non-stabling	City: measuring to the building and its street access is proper; easement/areas within 100 ft matter because they are part of the stable structure	Held: distance must be measured to the structure functioning as the stable; measuring to the easement or front areas does not satisfy §54-206(p)(1).

Key Cases Cited

Gurganious v. City of Beaufort, 317 S.C. 481, 454 S.E.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1995) (appellate deference to local zoning decisions)
Somers v. Charleston Cty. Parks & Recreation Comm’n, 319 S.C. 65, 459 S.E.2d 841 (1995) (standards for reversing zoning board findings)
Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of Myrtle Beach, 360 S.C. 459, 602 S.E.2d 76 (Ct. App. 2004) (ordinance intent governs when reasonably discoverable)
Beaufort Cty. v. S.C. State Election Comm’n, 395 S.C. 366, 718 S.E.2d 432 (2011) (in pari materia construction of related statutes/ordinances)
Mikell v. County of Charleston, 386 S.C. 153, 687 S.E.2d 326 (2009) (broader review for ordinance-construction issues)
Penny Creek Assocs., LLC v. Fenwick Tarragon Apartments, LLC, 375 S.C. 267, 651 S.E.2d 617 (Ct. App. 2007) (HPR divides ownership interests but does not subdivide land or physically separate common areas)
Lancaster Cty. Bar Ass’n v. S.C. Comm’n on Indigent Def., 380 S.C. 219, 670 S.E.2d 371 (2008) (courts reject statutory constructions that produce absurd results)