Arkansas State Medical Board v. Byers
2017 Ark. 213
| Ark. | 2017Background
- Kristi Byers, an African American, was employed as Administrative Services Manager (ASM) for the Arkansas State Medical Board beginning October 2013 and classified as extra help.
- Board Executive Secretary Peggy Cryer alleged Byers took 232 hours of undocumented paid leave between Jan–July 2014 and terminated Byers on July 25, 2014, for not submitting leave slips.
- Byers sued (Dec. 2014) alleging race discrimination and retaliation under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief; she also asserted whistleblower claims (not at issue on appeal).
- Appellants (Board and Cryer) moved for summary judgment asserting sovereign immunity (for Board and Cryer in official capacity) and statutory immunity (for Cryer individually); the circuit court denied the motion.
- The Board and Cryer appealed interlocutory denial of immunity. The Arkansas Supreme Court considered (1) whether sovereign immunity barred ACRA claims against the Board and Cryer in her official capacity and (2) whether statutory immunity barred ACRA and federal civil‑rights claims against Cryer individually.
- The Court concluded sovereign immunity bars the official-capacity ACRA claims and that Cryer is entitled to statutory immunity on the state‑law ACRA individual-capacity claims, but the federal § 1981/§ 1983 claims against Cryer remain for resolution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sovereign immunity bars ACRA claims against the Board and Cryer (official capacity) | Byers: ultra vires or bad‑faith exceptions permit suit against state officers | Board/Cryer: Article 5, §20 bars suit against the State and its agencies/officers in official capacity | Held: Sovereign immunity bars ACRA claims against Board and Cryer in official capacity; dismissal directed (ultra vires/bad‑faith exceptions not shown on record) |
| Whether statutory immunity (Ark. Code §19‑10‑305) bars ACRA claims against Cryer individually | Byers: Cryer knowingly violated law; conduct shows malice (retaliation/discrimination) | Cryer: statutory immunity protects nonmalicious acts in scope of employment; no malice shown | Held: Cryer entitled to statutory immunity on state‑law ACRA individual‑capacity claims (Byers’ allegations insufficient to show malice) |
| Whether statutory immunity bars federal §1981 and §1983 claims against Cryer individually | Byers: federal claims proceed despite state immunity | Cryer: argues state statutory immunity applies to bar suit | Held: Reversed (court affirmed that Cryer is not entitled to statutory immunity for federal claims); federal immunity question not resolved by state statute here |
| Whether exceptions (ultra vires/bad faith) apply to overcome sovereign immunity | Byers: alleges actions were arbitrary/bad faith/ultra vires | Board/Cryer: no record evidence of ultra vires or bad‑faith conduct | Held: Exceptions not established in record; sovereign immunity stands for official‑capacity ACRA claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Simons v. Marshall, 369 Ark. 447 (recognizing exceptions to sovereign immunity where state is moving party or legislature waives immunity)
- Ark. Dep’t of Envtl. Qual. v. Al‑Madhoun, 374 Ark. 28 (judgment against State barred when it would control state action or impose liability)
- Grine v. Bd. of Trs., 338 Ark. 791 (statutory immunity and standards for malice; pleading/development requirements)
- Fuqua v. Flowers, 341 Ark. 901 (definition and discussion of malice for statutory immunity)
- Fegans v. Norris, 351 Ark. 200 (statutory immunity analyzed under qualified‑immunity principles)
- City of Little Rock v. Dayong Yang, 2017 Ark. 18 (interlocutory appeals permitted when denial of immunity from suit effectively lost)