Arkadi Minassian v. State
01-14-00966-CR
| Tex. App. | May 29, 2015Background
- Arkandi Minnassian was indicted for possession of 50+ pieces of identifying information (later amended to "telecommunication access device") arising from alleged gas-pump skimmer activity; arrested March 29, 2011 after surveillance at Houston area gas stations.
- HAFTF (Houston Area Fraud Task Force) surveillance and Secret Service affidavit describe tips linking Minnassian to distribution of skimmers, his travel from Dallas to Houston under an alias, his presence as a passenger in a Nissan Armada at pump sites, and discovery of laptops and other devices in the vehicle.
- Officers seized an open, powered-on laptop from the passenger area; agents reviewed it immediately and reported finding ~10,000 credit-card numbers and associated names; a federal search warrant was later obtained and unsealed.
- Minnassian filed a motion to suppress (arguing no probable cause, no exigency, automobile/search-incident exceptions inapplicable, and Article 14.03(a) violations). The trial court denied suppression; Minnassian pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 30 years.
- On appeal Minnassian raises four points: (1) Fourth Amendment violation by warrantless arrest/search of laptop, (2) violation of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(a), (3) ineffective assistance at the suppression hearing, and (4) involuntary guilty plea tied to alleged counsel failings and unlawful seizure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Minnassian) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Warrantless arrest & search — Fourth Amendment | Officers had probable cause based on informant tip + surveillance; exigency (vehicle mobility & risk of data loss) justified seizing/examining laptops and supported later warrant | Tip was conclusory; surveillance did not supply probable cause for arrest or automobile exception; Riley prohibits warrantless forensic search of digital devices without a warrant | Trial court denied suppression (appellant challenges denial on appeal) |
| 2. Violation of Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 14.03(a) (warrantless arrest authority) | Arrest was lawful under exceptions (suspicious place/exigent circumstances) and facts supported probable cause equivalent under Muniz | Passenger conduct (brief stops, no pumping) equally consistent with innocent activity; Article 14.03(a) not satisfied so arrest unlawful | Trial court found arrest lawful (appellant contests ruling) |
| 3. Ineffective assistance at suppression hearing | (Implied) counsel advanced suppression arguments; State contends counsel acted reasonably | Counsel failed to argue that evidence from warrantless forensic laptop search (the ~10,000 card numbers) was the fruit of the poisonous tree and that the federal warrant was tainted; thus counsel performance was deficient and prejudicial | Appellant asserts Strickland violation; trial record contains limited suppression advocacy and no witness testimony; appellant preserved claim for appeal |
| 4. Involuntariness of guilty plea | Plea was made voluntarily after waiver of rights; sentence within statutory range; defendant was advised and certified right to appeal | Plea was induced by counsel's erroneous advice/pressure after adverse suppression ruling; had counsel performed, defendant would not have pled | Trial court accepted plea and sentenced; appellant challenges voluntariness on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (U.S. 2014) (police generally must obtain a warrant before searching digital data on cell phones or computers seized incident to arrest)
- Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (U.S. 1969) (scope of search incident to arrest limited to area within suspect's immediate control)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1983) (probable cause assessed under the ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ test for informant tips)
- United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (U.S. 1982) (automobile exception permits warrantless vehicle searches when probable cause exists)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (U.S. 1963) (evidence obtained by exploitation of illegality is inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree)
- Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (Texas Article 14.03(a)(1) interpreted as functional equivalent of probable cause)
- Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (general requirement that arrests be made pursuant to warrants, subject to exceptions)
- Keehn v. State, 279 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (automobile exception and mobility exigency principles in Texas)
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (U.S. 2013) (warrant required for certain investigations into the curtilage; cautions about relying on evidence obtained by novel warrantless intrusions)