471 P.3d 607
Ariz.2020Background
- Four PACs sought to place statutory initiatives on the Nov. 2020 ballot and asked the Arizona Supreme Court to compel the Secretary of State to allow use of E‑Qual (an online signature‑gathering system) and to accept E‑Qual signatures.
- At filing (April 1, 2020) three PACs had gathered significant signatures (one had already met the constitutional minimum); the COVID‑19 pandemic and a Governor stay‑at‑home order limited traditional in‑person signature gathering.
- Petitioners sued by special action seeking mandamus relief to force the Secretary to accept E‑Qual initiative petitions.
- The Court interpreted Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(9) as requiring signatures be made in the personal presence of a circulator on a physical "sheet," and concluded E‑Qual’s remote, electronic procedure does not satisfy that text.
- The Court held Petitioners failed to prove Section 1(9) imposed a "severe burden" as applied (three of four petitioners ultimately collected sufficient signatures without E‑Qual), found the provision justified by Arizona’s interest in election integrity, and denied the requested relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Section 1(9) require in‑person, paper signatures or permit E‑Qual? | Section 1(9) does not preclude electronic/remote signatures; E‑Qual substantially complies. | Section 1(9) requires a circulator to witness signatures "in the presence" on a "sheet" (paper); E‑Qual is remote/electronic and incompatible. | Section 1(9) unambiguously requires in‑person, paper signatures; E‑Qual does not comply. |
| Standing and jurisdiction to seek mandamus/special action | Petitioners: Secretary is sole official who can accept E‑Qual and thus can redress injury. | Intervenors: injury caused by COVID‑19, not Secretary; question not proper special action. | Court exercised special action/mandamus jurisdiction and found Petitioners had standing. |
| As‑applied constitutional challenge (First, Fourteenth, ballot access) | COVID‑19 made in‑person gathering practically impossible; enforcing Section 1(9) severely burdens ballot access, free speech, and association. | Section 1(9) is neutral, applies to all initiatives, protects integrity of the process, and Petitioners were not reasonably diligent. | No severe burden shown; Section 1(9) is an important regulatory measure and survives less‑rigorous review (and would survive strict scrutiny). |
| Content‑based free speech challenge (unequal treatment vs. candidates) | Denying initiatives E‑Qual but allowing candidates is content‑based discrimination. | Law is neutral; all initiative proponents are equally subject to Section 1(9); candidate provisions arise from different statutory schemes. | Not content‑based; Reed inapplicable; Section 1(9) does not target message or viewpoint. |
Key Cases Cited
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (U.S. 1992) (balancing test for ballot‑access burdens and level of scrutiny)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (U.S. 1983) (framework for evaluating election regulations)
- Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (U.S. 1988) (petition circulation as core political speech)
- Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (U.S. 1999) (states have leeway to regulate initiative process; distinguishing burdens)
- W. Devcor, Inc. v. City of Scottsdale, 168 Ariz. 426 (Ariz. 1991) (court will not rewrite constitutional text for convenience)
- Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (U.S. 1944) (warning against governing by necessity)
- Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (U.S. 1974) (reasonable‑diligence standard in ballot‑access analysis)
- Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739 (U.S. 1987) (standard for facial challenges)
- Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2006) (importance of electoral integrity)
- Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (U.S. 1997) (states’ regulatory interests in electoral schemes)